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The Committee for Economic Develop-
ment is an independent research and policy
organization of some 250 business leaders and
educators. CED is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and
nonpolitical. Its purpose is to propose policies
that bring about steady economic growth at
high employment and reasonably stable prices,
increased productivity and living standards,
greater and more equal opportunity for every
citizen, and an improved quality of life for all. 
All CED policy recommendations must have
the approval of Trustees on the Research and
Policy Committee. This committee is directed
under the bylaws, which emphasize that “all
research is to be thoroughly objective in char-
acter, and the approach in each instance is to
be from the standpoint of the general welfare
and not from that of any special political or
economic group.” The committee is aided by a
Research Advisory Board of leading social sci-
entists and by a small permanent professional
staff. 
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pending
specific legislative proposals; its purpose is to
urge careful consideration of the objectives set
forth in this statement and of the best means of
accomplishing those objectives. 
Each statement is preceded by extensive dis-
cussions, meetings, and exchange of memo-
randa. The research is undertaken by a sub-
committee, assisted by advisors chosen for their
competence in the field under study. 
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove a
policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privilege
of submitting individual comments for publica-
tion. 
The recommendations presented herein are those
of the Trustee members of the Research and Policy
Committee and the responsible subcommittee. They
are not necessarily endorsed by other Trustees or by
nontrustee subcommittee members, advisors, contrib-
utors, staff members, or others associated with CED.
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After the publication of CED’s policy state-
ment, The Digital Economy: Promoting
Competition, Innovation, and Opportunity in
2001, the Research and Policy Committee 
created CED’s Digital Connections Council, 
a group of information technology experts
from CED trustee-affiliated companies. The
DCC was established to advise CED on the
policy issues associated with cutting-edge
technologies. This report, concerning the
relationship between digital intellectual 
property and economic growth, is the first of
its products. 
CED appreciates greatly the efforts of the
members of the Committee, and in particular,
the work of Paul Horn, Senior Vice President
for Research of IBM Corporation and Chair
of the DCC, for his leadership in bringing
this report to completion.
The DCC report is accompanied by a brief
introduction by the CED Research and Policy
Committee. Since this report is the work of
the DCC rather than CED Trustees, it is not
an official CED policy statement. The
Research and Policy Committee, however, on
behalf of CED’s Trustees, welcomes this
report and recommends it to readers as an
excellent analysis of the issue of balancing
intellectual property rights and the incentives
for long-term growth in the digital age.
Patrick W. Gross, Co-Chair
Research and Policy Committee
Chairman, The Lovell Group
Founder and Senior Advisor, AMS
Bruce K. MacLaury, Co-Chair
Research and Policy Committee
President Emeritus
The Brookings Institution
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Digital piracy — the theft of entertain-
ment products in digital form from the
Internet — has become a fast-growing activity
and, for many, a pressing economic and social
concern. Easy access to copyrighted works
through file-sharing programs has allowed
many users almost unlimited access to record-
ed music and, over time, other types of enter-
tainment in digital form. Along with this
access has come a regrettable change in pub-
lic ethos that has made it acceptable or trivial
in the eyes of many to pirate creative works.
Piracy is claimed to have imposed severe
losses on content producers, but the real
damages arising from piracy are hard to mea-
sure. Music industry sales of CDs are down,
but not necessarily outside the range of varia-
tion they have shown in the past. Moreover,
comparable technological challenges have
always been met by claims of imminent disas-
ter: the VCR was said to be the end of the
movie industry; the player piano was predict-
ed to ruin sales of sheet music; and radio was
expected by many to end live attendance at
baseball games. But in all of these cases, the
technological advance proved to expand,
rather than reduce, the growth of the service
in question, as the businesses involved devel-
oped new models that incorporated the new
technology into their product design and
marketing.  This may well be the case for the
network-based provision of music and other
services, but the transition is still a distant one
and the immediate problem of piracy
remains.
The many analyses of the piracy issue have
taken one of two focuses — either the effect
of piracy on specific economic interests (such
as the music industry) or the moral or ethical
implications of digital theft. While these are
reasonable perspectives, the lens through
which CED traditionally views these issues is
that of economic growth and productivity.
That is, what is the affect of digital piracy on
growth, productivity, and our future standard
of living, and what would be the effects of
alternative policies to curb it? That is the per-
spective of the DCC report and, in the midst
of what is often a passionate debate, it is an
important starting point. 
The purpose of the institution of intellec-
tual property, as the DCC report makes clear,
is to provide incentives to innovators to pro-
duce new creations. But the reason why these
incentives are in order is not because of a
concern with the prosperity of innovators, but
because of a larger desire to provide to soci-
ety a steady stream of innovations that lead to
further gains and enhancements of the stan-
dard of living. “If I see further,” Newton once
remarked, “it is because I stand on the shoul-
ders of giants.” Like Newton, every innovator
in some crucial way owes a substantial debt to
the innovators who went before her or him.
The purpose of protection for intellectual
property, therefore, is to keep this virtuous
cycle of innovation going — to keep new
innovations flowing to those who improve
upon them so that those innovations, in turn,
can be used by still others. This process lies at
the heart of long-term economic growth.†
This process, therefore, requires that intel-
lectual property law and policy strike a fine
balance between the rights of innovators (cre-
ators) and the right of subsequent imitators
and users (disseminators) who turn those cre-
ations into new economic activity. In order to
help create this balance, intellectual property
law and custom have established a “public
domain,” that is, a class of intellectual proper-
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† See, CED, How Economies Grow: The CED Perspective on Raising
the Long-Term Standard of Living (Washington, DC: May 2003)
for an explanation of this relationship.
ty to which the public has some right. The
copyrights to some works may expire after a
fixed time period. In addition, the purchasers
of an intellectual work like a book or record
are allowed to let a friend borrow it for their
own enjoyment (the right of “first sale”); and
regardless of copyright, some uses — like
copies for use in a school room (“fair use”)
— are often legal. This balance has been built
into law to reflect two facts: first, that the
incentives afforded to innovators do not have
to be absolute in order to convey adequate
incentives, and second, that once intellectual
creations have been created, the public has a
strong interest in their dissemination.
The social value of a public domain, the
balance between imitators and innovators,
and the historic deference given to the rights
of first sale and fair use are of great impor-
tance when considering what to do about 
digital piracy. There can be no question that
prosecuting those who break the law is both
valid and important, but many anti-piracy
proposals go much further than that.  Many
of the proposals would require consumers to
add hardware or software to their computing
devices that would add to cost and reduce
interoperability regardless of the machine’s
use. This would slow the use of digital tech-
nology and its contribution to long-term
innovation. Moreover, many proposed out-
right prohibitions on access to digital materi-
al explicitly denies users the prerogatives they
have traditionally enjoyed under the doc-
trines of first sale and fair use. Thus, the risk
in taking action on digital piracy is that we
make choices that move the finely crafted 
historical balance away from the imitators
and users and towards innovators. Finally, we
are concerned about proposals that direct the
government to anoint one particular techno-
logical solution to a social problem; this
reduces incentives for future innovation and
gives no one the incentive to solve the piracy
“problem” at minimum social cost.
As the DCC report notes, the ultimate
solutions to the problem of digital piracy are
new business models. Just as player pianos
and radio expanded the market for music
and radio and television led to greater inter-
est in televised and broadcast sports, there is
every reason to expect that digital technology
will expand the market for entertainment by
reducing the cost of producing and dissemi-
nating it. Moreover, we must bear in mind
that these are the issues confronting the 
marketers of digital product, who are often not
the creators of it — the difference between a
publishing house and an author. The publish-
ing house is a business model for distributing
the author’s work — the economy depends
less on this specific manner of distribution
than it does the work of authors who provide
the economy with creative input.
The DCC’s recommendations are carefully
considered and should be given serious con-
sideration. The moral issues raised by wide-
spread theft and the economic burden theft
imposes on some businesses are of great con-
cern. But they are not sufficient cause to take
actions that could slow the rate of societal
innovation so crucial to long-term economic
growth.
On behalf of CED and its Trustees, the
Research and Policy committee welcomes this
contribution by the DCC to the debate.
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There has been an explosion in the popu-
larity of downloading and transmitting high-
value digital content, triggered by the growth
of the Internet and the evolution of peer-to-
peer systems. At the same time, there is a sub-
stantial disconnect between public attitudes
toward copyright and the letter of the law,
and growing concern among copyright-hold-
ers over the erosion of their rights. The
National Academy of Sciences has identified
the phenomenon at the center of these devel-
opments and labeled it the “digital dilemma”:
The same technologies that allow the cre-
ation and manipulation of digital content (as
well as its perfect reproduction and nearly
free distribution) can also be used to prevent
access to digital content. 
The result is a major policy debate
between those who seek to protect their
rights in digital content and those concerned
about the public access to content that has
traditionally been guaranteed under copy-
right law. In this emerging digital world,
what, if anything, should be done to ensure
that authors, artists, songwriters, and musi-
cians have adequate incentives to create con-
tent? And what, if anything, should be done
to protect the public’s access rights, devel-
oped in the physical world, in order to
encourage innovation and dissemination and
to enhance the public domain? 
This report from the Digital Connections
Council (DCC) of the Committee for
Economic Development presents a different
view of this “digital dilemma.” Because of
CED’s mission to foster economic growth, the
DCC has focused on the economic impact of
copyright protection in the digital age and
the potential economic effects of proposals
for change. The report briefly explores the
history of copyright law, revealing that legal
protection of the rights of creators has always
been explicitly balanced against protection of
ongoing innovation. The DCC brings the per-
spective of the second innovator — the creator
of new social value based on existing copy-
righted works — to bear, noting that every
creator owes a debt to what has come before.
For this reason, our intellectual property 
systems are based on providing incentives to
both create new material and to make such
material open to the public for use for subse-
quent creation. The report then discusses
current proposals for legislative and regulato-
ry change, focusing on requests by the con-
tent distribution industries for technical copy
protection mandates. Such mandates would
have substantial effects on the information
technology and consumer electronics indus-
tries in this country, on innovation, and on
the economic growth that stems from the
freedom to innovate.
These proposals were evaluated against
the following questions:
1. How will these proposals affect 
innovation?
2. How will these proposals affect the
growth of our high-tech economy?
3. What impact will these proposals have 
on the broad range of information 
thought of as the public domain?
The DCC found that while digitization of
content is obviously changing the world’s eco-
nomic landscape, there have been other dra-
matic technological breakthroughs in the
recent past that have profoundly changed
relationships among producers of content,
their distributors, and content users.
Introduction of the phonograph, radio, tele-
vision, and videocassette recorders have all
led to fundamental changes in content mar-
kets. But throughout these prior changes in
the world of physical distribution, copyright
law maintained its basic bargain: Society
should provide incentives to creators and 
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prevent wholesale appropriation of their
work, while at the same time ensuring both
that subsequent creators can build upon a
creator’s work and that the public as a whole
can have access to the creation. The DCC
believes that this basic bargain should contin-
ue to inform copyright law in the digital
world in order to stimulate innovation and
enhance economic growth. Without this bar-
gain in place, under-protection of works may
inhibit initial creation, while over-protection
may inhibit “follow-on” innovation by the mil-
lions who come after the initial creator. 
Drawing on relevant economic and legal
evidence, the Digital Connections Council of
the Committee for Economic Development is
making the following recommendations:
1. Because quick legislative or regulatory
solutions for the problem of digital copy-
right protection pose risks to innovation
and economic growth and are likely to
have unintended consequences in a period
of rapid technological change, we should
move slowly. Our first concern should be
to “do no harm.” We should dedicate the
next two years to attempting to build con-
sensus about the appropriate role in the
digital age for traditional legal safety 
valves that balance the exclusive rights of
creators in copyright regimes with users’
rights. The DCC looks forward to facilitat-
ing this national and international 
dialogue.
2. The development and testing of new 
business models for the distribution of 
creative content should be given the high-
est priority by the content industries. We
should not turn to law or regulation to
protect any particular business model.
3. Existing solutions to the issue of unautho-
rized uses, such as enforcement and edu-
cation, should continue to be explored. 
4. We recognize the need for digital rights
management (DRM) systems that will
allow creators to be rewarded for their
efforts. We are skeptical about govern-
ment-mandated DRM, and we recommend
that manufacturers not be required to
build in mandated copy protection tech-
nologies. But DRM systems provide a use-
ful “speed bump” for consumers by
inhibiting unauthorized uses of materials.
During this period of consensus building
about “safety valves” in intellectual proper-
ty law, we encourage continued experi-
mentation in private DRM systems. In par-
ticular, the capacity of such systems to
accommodate users’ rights traditionally
allowed under intellectual property law
needs to be further explored so that the
appropriate copyright balance can be
maintained. If government-mandated sys-
tems are proposed, they should be evaluat-
ed on the basis of their capability to main-
tain such a balance and their convenience
for consumers. Consumers should play a
substantial role in evaluating and approv-
ing mandated technological protection
systems. 
5. Market-based economic tools that provide
incentives for copyright-holders to facili-
tate follow-on innovation should be con-
sidered —- including measures to provide
earlier dedication of copyrighted materials
to the public domain.
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3Changes in technology, law, and business
practices have combined to create a perfect
storm that is raging around our societal con-
ceptions of intellectual property. At the heart
of these changes is the shift from analog to
digital forms of information. Digital informa-
tion can be processed in an infinite variety of
ways, copied without degradation and at
almost no cost, and can, over rapidly evolving
communications media such as the Internet,
be distributed virtually free to anybody and
everybody who is connected. Digitization plus
the Internet thus enables the world at large
to have access to more information than the
greatest libraries in history ever possessed —
and allows anyone to be a creator and a pub-
lisher. 
But the blessings of digitization can be
seen as curses by copyright-owners.
Digitization plus the Internet threatens to
deprive creators and distributors of control
over how and in what form their works are
made available to the public, and of the
rewards that may flow from that control. 
Directly connected to digitization is the
trend of replacing physical objects such as
CDs, reels of film, magazines, or books with
nonphysical objects – intangible aggregations
of bits that replicate the information con-
tained in the physical objects. We may have
shelves full of CDs, but we may also have hard
drives filled with bits that constitute copies of
what are on those CDs or on CDs belonging
to our friends. Yet legal rules and many busi-
ness models have been developed over the
years based on the production and distribu-
tion of physical objects rather than intangible
goods.
Another change associated with this move
from tangible to intangible goods is the move
from owning physical objects to licensing
intangible goods. We are accustomed to buy-
ing recordings, books, even computer soft-
ware CDs that serve as tangible expressions of
human creativity. But in the digital intangible
world we are increasingly being told that we
are not a purchaser of a creative work but a
licensee of some segments of the intellectual
property rights associated with that work.
Unlike the far-reaching rights associated with
ownership of objects, licenses generally come
with a limited set of powers strictly deter-
mined by the holder of the intellectual prop-
erty rights — and these rights are not only set
out in writing in licenses, but are also,
increasingly, coded in software envelopes sur-
rounding the content.
We are moving from an analog world that
allows resale of objects, once these objects
have been distributed (so-called “first sale”
rights), to a digital world that has the poten-
tial, through use of technology, to set strict
limits on what can be done with content that
has been made publicly available. Where the
analog world default rule was “everything not
prohibited is permitted” (as a matter of reali-
ty, if not law), proposed architectures of tech-
nical control in the digital world allow the
operation of a very different default rule:
“everything not permitted by the copyright-
holder is prohibited.” 
Digitization offers the possibility, at least in
the short term, of the most finely grained
control over information that can be imag-
ined. This has created what the National
Academy of Sciences has labeled the “digital
dilemma.” As the Academy put it, digital tech-
nology has the “potential to demolish a care-
ful balancing of public good and private
interest that has emerged from the evolution
of U.S. intellectual property law over the past
200 years.” Technology, in short, has the
potential to trump law.
In this new world, the nightmares of both
copyright-owners and of consumers are vivid:
Copyright-owners see Napster-like technolo-
gies and the Internet destroying their control
and assert that rampant piracy is ruining
I. INTRODUCTION
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them; consumers see proposals for locking
down information and worry about a world in
which all information is pay-per-view. 
The Digital Connections Council (DCC)
of the Committee for Economic Development
believes that informed debate is critical to the
development of a balanced, coherent, and
enlightened intellectual property framework
that can survive the digital dilemma. The
DCC is not made up of lawyers schooled in
the fine points of intellectual property law
jurisprudence. Nor is the DCC made up of
representatives of any particular industry seg-
ment, but has representatives from many dif-
ferent industries. The DCC consists of infor-
mation technology specialists committed to
the development of policies that will enable
our nation — and the world — to obtain the
benefits of economic growth and to harness
the potential of digitization for the good of
society as a whole.
The DCC began its examination of the
“digital dilemma” with the goal of determin-
ing what intellectual property policies are
most likely to stimulate the innovation critical
to economic growth.  As Chairman
Greenspan recently asked,
If our objective is to maximize economic
growth, are we striking the right balance in
our protection of intellectual property rights?
Are the protections sufficiently broad to
encourage innovation but not so broad as to
shut down follow-on innovation? Are such
protections so vague that they produce
uncertainties that raise risk premiums and
the cost of capital? How appropriate is our
current system—developed for a world in
which physical assets predominated—for an
economy in which value increasingly is
embodied in ideas rather than tangible 
capital? 1
The DCC started its work by reviewing the
economic underpinnings of copyright law. It
traced the evolution of copyright law from its
constitutional foundation to the present.
Following the movement from “atoms” to
“bits,” from analog to digital information,
and from tangible to intangible goods, the
DCC saw profound impacts on both copy-
right-holders and users of information. It
reviewed legislative, regulatory, and technical
proposals put forth by copyright-holders to
solve the problems caused by the perfect
storm, and attempted to understand and eval-
uate these proposals based on the economic
growth-oriented mission of the Committee
for Economic Development. Given this
unique perspective, the DCC sought answers
to three questions:
1. How will these proposals affect 
innovation?
2. How will these proposals affect the
growth of our high-tech economy?
3. What impact will these proposals
have on the broad range of inform
tion thought of as the public
domain?
This report contains the Council’s findings.
5II. COPYRIGHT AND THE ECONOMICS 
OF INNOVATIONS
Copyright provides a creator with a
monopoly over the distribution and sale of a
work for a limited time. Like any monopoly, it
imposes costs on society. But our laws allow
the copyright monopoly to exist because it
“provides a benefit to society by providing an
incentive for the production of new creative
works,” which often require substantial invest-
ment in order to come into being.2 As a dis-
tinguished group of economists recently told
the Supreme Court:
To produce a new book, film, or other cre-
ative work, an author must make a substan-
tial up-front investment. For the resulting
work to be profitable overall, the author
must recoup her initial investment through
sale of the work to consumers. …. For prod-
ucts generally, the second competitor who
wishes to bring the same product to market
must incur the same kinds of costs as the
original entrant in order to participate in
the market. Books, films, and other creative
works are different: without legal protection,
an author cannot prevent others from appro-
priating the fruits of the original invest-
ment. Here, a second competitor can quickly
enter the market by simply copying the work
and offering it for sale, without incurring
similar development costs. Without the abili-
ty to exclude, entry may be quick and
easy…and non-recovery of initial invest-
ment by the author is very likely.3
Thus, the incentives provided by copyright
protection are designed to encourage innova-
tion by creators. A system that eliminated
incentives for creators, by allowing their
works to be easily appropriated by others
without recompense, would likely lead to a
decline in innovation. 
But copyright law also takes into account
the needs of users and subsequent innovators
who benefit from access to the creator’s work.
The importance of sharing acts of creation to
achieving the goals of intellectual property
law can be seen by asking a simple question:
If an intellectual property regime successfully
encouraged vast amounts of creative produc-
tion but none of this production was shared
beyond the creator, would the regime be con-
sidered successful? Obviously, the answer
would be “No.” 
Intellectual property law provides a way of
allocating the costs associated with creative
activity to either the first innovator or to sub-
sequent (or “follow-on”) innovators. Many
recent calls for changes in copyright law have
focused on a perceived need for greater con-
trol by, and incentives for, the first creator.
But progress in both science and art is incre-
mental and, ultimately, cumulative. As Sir
Isaac Newton wrote, “If I have seen far it is by
standing on the shoulders of giants.” In a dif-
ferent time, the band U2 echoed Newton:
“Every artist is a cannibal and every poet is a
thief.”
The rights of, and the costs to, both the
first and subsequent innovators represent an
inherent tradeoff.† The structure of intellec-
tual property law will affect the costs of inno-
vation borne by either the first innovator (the
creator) or the second innovator (the individ-
ual who benefits from the first work in creat-
ing something new for the world). It is impos-
sible to maximize the incentives for both
innovators concurrently. For example, if we
decided to raise the costs of the second inno-
vator, we could extend all copyrights and
devote substantial resources to enforcing
them. The likely result would be to raise the
cost of producing new works by follow-on 
† See Suzanne Scotchmer, “Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law,” 5 J. Economic
Perspectives 29 (1991); See also Suzanne Scotchmer and Jerry
Green, “Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law,” 21 Rand J.
Econ. 131 (1990).
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innovators and to reduce the number of such
creations.4 On the other hand, if the costs are
raised for the first innovator, by making copy-
rights and patents very limited in scope and
duration, it is likely that the number of new
works by this group will be reduced. The
question that we confront is: Which alloca-
tion of costs will create the greatest societal
benefit? 
In weighing this question we must also
decide how much control over subsequent
creations we give to the first creator. If we
believe that the first innovator has unrivalled
knowledge of the innovation, we might be
persuaded that he or she is uniquely able to
provide subsequent innovation from that
foundation. This would justify providing the
first innovator with unlimited control over
the innovation. But there is only one first
innovator/creator, and innumerable poten-
tial second innovators. It seems likely that
among the many millions of potential follow-
on innovators, at least one is likely to be able
to better build on the first innovator’s work.
Why would this one area of human activity be
exempt from our view that competitive
sources of supply — here, the supply of subse-
quent innovation — are preferable to
monopolies? Think of the wheel and the mil-
lions of inventions dependent on it — it
would have made no sense to have allowed
the first creator of the wheel to control all
derivative uses of his or her invention.
Copyright law balances protection of ini-
tial creators with the importance of the com-
petitive supply of follow-on innovation, and is
(or should be) cautious about providing con-
trol to the initial innovator that would allow
barring of subsequent innovators or control
over the scope and direction of their innova-
tion. Such caution is important in the digital
world, in which “improvements in the tech-
nology of search and recombination continue
to expand the economic importance of new
creation built upon old materials.”5 DCC
believes that for innovation to continue as the
engine for economic growth, the past cannot
be allowed to totally control the future. The
current public debate about copyright policy
for the digital age needs to continue to pro-
vide sufficient weight to the importance of
follow-on innovators — because every first
creator “stands on the shoulders of giants.” 
Ultimately, the balance to be struck is a
product of a societal decision. Even first cre-
ators cannot succeed in the absence of the
rule of law. In return for the incentives that
the law provides, first creators have some obli-
gation to the society that enforces the rule of
law. Making first creators share their works is
the obligation that our society requires; this
obligation supports society as a whole.
If the goal is to find an appropriate, bal-
anced approach to copyright that recognizes
the interests of both creators and follow-on
innovators (and other users) in a world
where perfect copies can be freely distrib-
uted, it is useful to look at why copyright
arose in the first place. The first phase of the
copyright story covers the development of
early non-U.S. copyright statutes and U.S.
Constitutional approaches to copyright.
A. ORIGINS OF COPYRIGHT
Copyright began in England as a method
to obtain control over seditious publications.
Before the development of the printing press,
the Crown maintained control over publica-
tion of ideas it did not like by punishing
authors directly and confiscating particularly
heretical works. But when the printing press
arrived, it became clear that trying to control
copies of works once they were in general cir-
culation was very difficult — and was less
effective than exerting control over the press-
es themselves. For this reason, early royal dec-
larations required printers to print their
names, cities, and date of publication on each
work to make it easier for the monarchy to
locate the press responsible for a particular
work.†
The Crown gave the group of printers
known as the Stationers Company the exclu-
sive right to own a printing press and printing
tools, as well as the exclusive right to practice
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT
1709 The Statute of Anne is passed by the British Parliament to prevent monopolies in the printing
trade and encourage the production and distribution of written works.  
1787 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the U.S. Constitution states that “the Congress shall have
power…to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” 
1790 The Copyright Act of 1790 is implemented by the First Congress, which granted American
authors monopoly rights over their work for a period of fourteen years, with a possible 
renewal of another fourteen years. The term of copyright protection would later be extended
to twenty-eight years in 1831. 
1909 The U.S. Copyright Act is revised to expand copyright protection to all works of authorship,
including music. 
1976 The U.S. Copyright Act is revised again. The term of protection is extended to the life of the
author plus 50 to 75 years. More importantly, the “first sale” and “fair use” doctrines are 
codified. The first sale exception, in Section 109(a), limits the distributional rights of the
copyright holder to the first sale of each copy. The fair use affirmative defense to infringe-
ment, found in Section 107, states that “the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use
by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
LANDMARKS IN COPYRIGHT LAW
† See generally, Irah Donner, “The Copyright Clause of the
U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Framers Include It With
Unanimous Approval?” 36 Am. J. Legal History 361, 366-369
(1992); Paul Edward Geller, “Copyright History and the Future:
What’s Culture Got To Do With It?” 47 J. Copyright Soc. of Am.
209, 216-218 (2000).
the “mistery or art” of printing. Interestingly,
it also gave the Stationers Company the right
to enforce its monopoly by burning the books
and presses of its competition and imprison-
ing anyone owning a press or found engaged
in printing.
The Stationers quickly agreed not to com-
pete with one another and established a regis-
tration scheme for authorized copies. The
rights of publishers remained perpetual
under the Stationers’ rules. This was monop-
olistic behavior, but it was encouraged by the
government in order to enable control of the
press. Thus, as of the 1660s in England, all
printed materials needed to be licensed by
Parliament and published by a member of
the Stationers Company. Every item printed
needed to have a title page giving the author,
publisher, and place of publication. 
But when censorship laws expired in 1694,
the copyright monopoly ended as well. The
old monopolists suffered a great deal, and
finally managed in 1709 to get a version of
the previous system back into law.† This act,
the Copyright Act of 1709 (also known as the
Statute of Queen Anne) was “An Act for the
Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the
Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or
Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times
therein mentioned.” It was intended to pre-
vent future monopolies of the printing trade,
by allowing anyone to print books, and was
aimed at encouraging production and distri-
bution of new works:
Whereas printers, booksellers, and other per-
sons have of late frequently taken the liberty
of printing, reprinting, and publishing, or
causing to be printed, reprinted, and pub-
lished, books and other writings, without the
consent of the authors or proprietors of such
books and writings, to their very great detri-
ment, and too often to the ruin of them and
their families: for preventing therefore such
practices for the future, and for the encour-
agement of learned men to compose and
write useful books. . . . 
The Statute of Anne represented a change
— instead of the goal being censorship, the
goal was now to provide a framework that
would allow the printing industry as a whole
to do well. And the crown and legislature
wanted the printing industry to do well in
order to promote the free expression of
ideas, not because they were delighted with
the monopoly of printers. The Statute of
Anne recognized that it took a good deal of
money for printers to buy equipment and set
up to print, and there needed to be incen-
tives to make printers willing to do so.
Without protection of the copyright, the
printer would be foolish to invest the money
to print new works that could then be quickly
undersold. Thus, this Act was designed to
protect an overall societal interest in the cre-
ation of new works, and to gradually elimi-
nate the Stationers’ monopoly on the right to
print.††
To this end, the Statute of Queen Anne
granted a 21-year extension of the existing
copyright monopoly of the Stationers
Company.6 By limiting the time of the copy-
right monopoly, the Act created a “public
domain” for works whose copyright had
expired.
B. THE RELUCTANT
CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT
OF A MONOPOLY
The framers of the United States
Constitution, suspicious of all monopolies to
begin with, knew the history of copyright as a
tool of censorship and press control. They
wanted to make sure that copyright was not
used for these purposes in the United States.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution is now
known as the “Intellectual Property” or
“Copyright Clause” and states:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors
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† See, Tyler Ochoa and Mark Rose, “The Anti-Monopoly
Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause,” 84 J. Patent and
Trademark Office Society 909, 914-918 (2002).
†† See generally, Association of Research Libraries, (November
2002), Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, 
available at <http://arl.cni.org/info/frn/copy/timeline.html>
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.
Limited rights are explicitly made avail-
able in the Constitution only to “authors,”
and the purpose of such rights is to promote
the progress of the arts and sciences. This
requires that works be accessible to the public
after the “limited” time has passed — when
they enter the public domain. The Framers
believed that a copyright monopoly was
worthwhile only if it encouraged the creation
of work that would eventually fall into the
public domain to be shared by others. 
Thomas Jefferson (who was against all
monopolies, including copyright) and James
Madison (who noted the benefits of a copy-
right monopoly in encouraging the develop-
ment of new works) engaged in an extensive
debate as to whether or not the Constitution
should include a provision that would allow
Congress to grant a “monopoly” power.† But
even Madison clearly understood copyright as
a monopoly granted only for a limited term
to promote the arts and sciences.7 Thus, the
Constitution adopted the traditional English
idea of copyright as trade regulation to limit
both the existence of monopoly and censor-
ship powers of the publishing industry and
the time-duration of this monopoly, thereby
creating a “public domain.”
Over time in the U.S., copyright protec-
tion has been extended to more types of
works (including maps, charts, music, prints,
broadcasts, motion pictures, and software
programs) and the length of protection has
been steadily extended (from an initial,
renewable term of 14 years to the current
term of life plus 70 years). U.S. acts uniformly
talk about the protection as being primarily
for the benefit of the author — invoking the
romantic vision of lonely creators in garrets
— and only benefiting the publisher as an
assignee, but in reality the laws have clearly
worked to benefit publishers, who in most
cases, hold the copyright.†† Under U.S. law,
corporate entities (“legal persons”) can have
the same rights as human beings and can
claim copyright in their own right. 
C. COPYRIGHT TODAY
In a nutshell, U.S. copyright law provides
authors of original works with a bundle of
five exclusive rights: (1) to reproduce the
work in copies, (2) to make derivative works,
such as translations, (3) to distribute copies
to the public, (4) to perform the work pub-
licly, and (5) to display the work publicly. (Of
course, no copyright exists in government
works, or in facts or data or ideas — only in
the “expression” of facts or ideas.) These
rights are provided for a limited period of
time, and are subject to a complicated series
of limitations and exceptions. 
The “author’s” rights of exclusivity (which
enable the author to charge for his/her/its
work) are balanced by “user” rights to make
private uses of already-distributed content.
For example, the so-called “first sale” doc-
trine embodied in Section 109(a) of the
Copyright Act of 1976 provides that the copy-
right owner’s right to control distribution of
copies only extends to the “first sale.” In
other words, the Copyright Act grants to
authors the exclusive right to distribute
copies of their work, but limits that right by
distinguishing between ownership of a copy-
right (the bundle of exclusive rights) and
ownership of a copy (the tangible material in
which a work is fixed), and by extinguishing
the copyright owner’s distribution right after
the first sale of each copy. This “first sale”
doctrine is the basis for standard practices
such as used book markets, the local video
store, and even exchanges of copyrighted
works between friends and family.≠ This first
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† See, Tyler Ochoa and Mark Rose, “The Anti-Monopoly
Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause,” 84 J. PTOS 909,
925-927 (2002).
†† The MPAA has echoed this traditional sentiment by calling
its educational game about copyright law (designed for school-
children) “Starving Artist.” Laura Holson, “Studios Moving to
Block Piracy of Films Online,” The New York Times, September
25, 2003.
≠ Commercial rental of software and phonorecords is prohibit-
ed under U.S. law because of the threat posed to these indus-
tries by modern duplication technologies.
sale doctrine has allowed the creation of
libraries that provide access to copyrighted
works to people who might not otherwise
have such access. A library can buy a single
copy of a work and then loan it to dozens or
hundreds of people, one at a time,† and,
because of the first sale doctrine, such loans
are not considered infringements of copy-
right. Although these loans might be seen as
making it impossible for the publisher to
make additional sales, as all potential pur-
chasers are potential library patrons, we know
that the creation of libraries did not kill the
publishing industry in this country. Both
authors and publishers have benefited from
the broadly educated public that libraries
encourage. 
A second important exception to the
exclusive rights of authors, the “fair use”
exception, allows a broad range of unregulat-
ed private uses of content, and, in legal
terms, provides an affirmative defense to
charges of infringement. Codified at 17
U.S.C. Section 107, the defense provides:
“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, includ-
ing such use by reproduction in copies . . . ,
for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copy-
right.” Courts weigh four broad non-exclusive
factors in deciding whether a particular
infringement was “fair” or not: the purpose
and nature of the use, the nature of the copy-
righted work, the amount and substantiality
of use, and the impact on the market for the
copyrighted work. “Fair use” depends on con-
text and, under present law, requires an after-
the-fact review of the circumstances. It does
not lend itself to clear and precise rules; for
example, it is not clear whether sending an
entire copy of a film or song to a friend over
the Internet is a fair use or not. The fair use
defense allows the public to use not only facts
and ideas contained in a copyrighted work,
but also expression itself in certain circum-
stances, and affords considerable latitude for
scholarship and comment, even for parody.
D. THE IMPORTANCE 
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
The public domain is commonly under-
stood to be the sphere in which contents are
free from intellectual property rights (Fair
uses of content — like the noncommercial
private copying allowed in the Sony case dis-
cussed in the next section of this report —
are outside the public domain in theory, but
have a similar impact in practice: providing
public access to information.)†† Overall, the
digitization of content has had a positive
impact on the size, effectiveness, and very
existence of the public domain. For example,
scientific data in digital form is much easier
to share, combine, and use than paper-based
information. And once such data is digital it
can be shared globally via the Internet and
used as the basis for further experiments and
developments that increase the utility of the
public domain.
Such openness can have direct human
benefits. As Paul Uhlir, director of
International Scientific & Technical
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† Indeed, according to the American Library Association,
“America’s libraries have long been among the nation’s largest
volume-purchasers of copyrighted works. According to surveys
published in 1998 by the National Center for Education
Statistics (U.S. Department of Education), the 8,891 U.S. pub-
lic library systems alone spent $789 million on library materials,
including electronic formats, in 1995. The 3,303 U.S. academic
libraries spent $1.3 billion on information resources in all for-
mats in 1994. These libraries now spend well over $2 billion.”
Comments of the Library Association before The Library of
Congress, The United States Copyright Office and The
Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, Inquiry Regarding Sections 109
and 117, Docket No. 000522150-0150-01, August 4, 2000.
†† See, Pamela Samuelson, “Digital Information, Networks, and
The Public Domain,” 68 J.L. & Contemporary Probs, (2002) p. 82-
83: “Across the border from the public domain are several cate-
gories of content that are widely enough usable that, for practi-
cal purposes, they seem to be part of the public domain. This
includes, importantly, much content that is protected by intel-
lectual property law but is widely available to the public, as
when it is posted on publicly accessible websites available to all
comers without fee or apparent restrictions on use. Also out-
side the public domain in theory, but seemingly inside in
effect, are such things as open source software; a penumbra of
privileged uses under fair use, experimental use, and other
rules that permit unlicensed uses and sharing of information to
take place; and standards that are licensed without payment of
royalties.” (Internal citations omitted from quote.)
Information Programs at the National
Academy of Sciences has said: “ ‘There’s a
general presupposition that public science
requires openness. Ultimately you need
access to the underlying facts and the sources
for research in order to verify the research
findings that are published and to do further
work — science builds on science. If you
don’t have that kind of transparency and
access to that information, the system breaks
down…’ Scientists used open databases and a
collaborative model to combat SARS, and
“the lesson of SARS is that global security
depends on allowing scientists to benefit
from a free flow of ideas and from the easy
cooperation of experts from home and
abroad.” 8
Access to information is also essential to
the functioning of a democracy. Information
is the necessary ingredient for the “uninhibit-
ed, robust, and wide-open” debate that
underlies the First Amendment’s guarantees.9
Without access to information, it is impossi-
ble to imagine widespread public participa-
tion in democratic processes. “[A] democracy
that involves wisely and collectively formulat-
ing attitudes, values, and conceptions of a
common good — as republicans believe — or
conceptions of a subgroup identity — as com-
plex democrats maintain — calls for a broad-
er range of information.” 10
The public domain is importantly one of
several “safety valves” that avoid conflict
between the First Amendment and copyright
law:
Any law — copyright included — that is
implemented by telling anyone that there are
some words or images that they may not
print, publish, or display publicly raises a
First Amendment question. When that law
is copyright law, the prohibition is normally
permitted, and conflict with the First
Amendment is generally avoided by safety
valves internal to copyright law-like the
idea/expression dichotomy, the fair use doc-
trine, or copyright law’s placement of some
materials in the public domain. . . . . But if
Congress passes a statute that undermines
those safety valves — say, by eliminating
fair use altogether or by passing a hypotheti-
cal law excluding fair use of works authored
by Republican Senators — of course that
statute would be subject to First Amendment
review, and would almost certainly fail.11
In the recent Eldred v. Ashcroft decision,
the Supreme Court recognized that copy-
rights were not necessarily “categorically
immune from challenges under the First
Amendment,” but held that as long as
Congress did not “alter[] the traditional con-
tours of copyright protection, further First
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”† Thus,
any Congressional action that has the effect
of substantially narrowing the public domain
and/or eliminating fair use might be subject
to First Amendment scrutiny. 
A key value of the public domain is that it
puts ideas into circulation by providing access
to these thoughts to a wide variety of people.
The public domain is a modern invention,
but it continues to enhance the movement
begun as we changed from an artisan culture
(in which people deeply understood particu-
lar processes but were unable to share these
insights beyond their locality) to the age of
Enlightenment and scientific understand-
ing— when broad sharing of local and partic-
ularized insight allowed individuals to build
generalized theories that could be tested sci-
entifically. 
In the U.S., there was a longtime presump-
tion that published works were in the public
domain unless copyright was explicitly
claimed. The reverse presumption operates
today, because no formalities are needed in
order to claim copyright — copyright protec-
tion is automatic, and you do not have to
write “Copyright 2003” on your work in order
to claim rights in it. But it remains the case
that ideas, methods, scientific principles, and
facts cannot be protected by copyright, and
thus are dedicated to the public domain
upon their publication. Arguably, the
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† Eldred v. Ashcroft opinion. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority of the Court, noted that the copyright clause and the
First Amendment “were adopted close in time. This proximity
indicated that, in the framers’ view, copyright’s limited monop-
olies are compatible with free speech principles.” 
Internet enables innumerable forms of publi-
cation, and allows the public domain to be
more robust and vital than ever before. If
access to facts and ideas (the unprotected
underpinnings of copyrighted works) is
denied, the scope of the available public
domain is inevitably narrowed.
President George Washington said in his
message to Congress leading to enactment of
the 1790 Copyright Act: “Knowledge is, in
every country, the surest basis of public 
happiness.” Ever since the founding of this
nation, knowledge — its creation and diffu-
sion — has been recognized as essential to
the public good. For this reason, the copy-
right statutes in this country are aimed not
only at encouraging creation but also at mini-
mizing monopolies, fostering learning, and
increasing the knowledge of the people by
increasing their access to the information.
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The first copyright laws came into being as
a reaction to the invention of the printing
press, and the interaction between copyright
law and new technology has continued to be
a source of friction and interest. New tech-
nologies historically have challenged our sys-
tem of protecting creative works through
copyright. Each new technology potentially
requires a balance between providing the
broader public with access to information
and creative works so that they can build on
what has gone before, on the one hand, and
supporting the incentives for creation provid-
ed by granting limited monopoly rights to
creators, on the other. 
A. HOW DOES COPYRIGHT 
INTERACT WITH NEW
TECHNOLOGIES?
The copyright/technology issue did not
first arise in reaction to Napster. While
today’s perfect storm appears uniquely chal-
lenging to the existing intellectual property
legal regime, it is not the first time that tech-
nological change has been seen as profound-
ly threatening. In 1906, John Philip Sousa
publicly bemoaned the future of American
music in words that still sound current: “I
foresee a marked deterioration in American
music and musical taste, an interruption in
the musical development of the country, and
a host of other injuries to music in its artistic
manifestation, by virtue — or rather, by vice
— of the multiplication of the various music
reproducing machines.” (According to Sousa,
these machines would not only cause
American music to suffer, but would also
cause a mother to “cease to croon her baby to
sleep with sweet lullabys (sic),” He feared that
bands would be “doomed to vanish,” singing
around the campfire would end, and “never
again will the soldier hear the defiant call of
the bugle.”)† 12 The machines that Sousa was
referring to were the player piano and newly
emerging phonographic media. 
Sousa was worried not only about damage
to American music, but also about damage to
his business model. As a rule, Sousa kept all
rights to his music. He was compensated, in
part, through royalties based on the sale of
sheet music. Yet the makers of piano rolls or
phonographic discs needed to buy only one
copy of a Sousa march, paying negligible roy-
alties, in order to pattern (“burn,” in our lexi-
con) a piano roll or disk. They could then
copy the pattern endlessly and sell directly to
consumers who previously might have pur-
chased sheet music.13
Sousa lost his legal battle in the Supreme
Court in 1908, but the Copyright Act of 1909
provided that the makers of piano rolls and
phonographic disks had to pay two cents to
the copyright-holder for every piano roll or
phonograph disk produced. The 1909 Act, in
effect, recognized the need to allow copy-
right-holders to be rewarded for use of their
work — and led to the creation of institutions
like ASCAP to collect royalties on behalf of
authors.
This pattern has been repeated time and
time again. Radio broadcasting carried with it
the risk of local musical performances being
superseded by national broadcasts produced
by a much more limited number of bands.
Other live local events, like athletic contests,
were perceived to be at risk of disappearing
13
IV. COPYRIGHT BACKGROUND: 
SECOND PHASE
† See also, Oliver Read and Walter L. Welch, From Tin Foil to
Stereo: Evolution of the Phonograph 175 (Howard W. Sams, 1959).
In a strange echo of Sousa’s comment, in 1996 ASCAP
informed summer camps nationwide that they had to pay
license fees to use any of the four million copyrighted songs
written or published by ASCAP members. After a (predictable)
public relations disaster, ASCAP retreated. James V. DeLong,
“ASCAP v. Girl Scouts: The Best Things in Life Aren’t Free, or,
Why You Might Be Better Off If You Wind Up Paying for Those
Campfire Singalongs,” National Law Journal, March 10, 1997.
because potential attendees would stay in
their living rooms, cocooned in front of the
radio console. 
But new business arrangements evolved.
At first, bands played on the air for free in
order to gain exposure for their live perform-
ances. Then, seeing that radio stations were
profiting, in part, from the fruits of their
labor, they fought to be paid both directly
and through royalties based on the radio air-
ing of their recorded work. Live broadcasts
from opera houses, concert halls, baseball sta-
diums, and dance palaces were, in and of
themselves, advertisements for the venues, a
means of increasing the fan base, and a
mechanism for stimulating sales of associated
products such as clothing and fan magazines.
The history of computer software protec-
tion provides a more recent example of inter-
action between copyright and new technology
in this second phase. In the 1980s, the soft-
ware industry used hardware locks, such as
key disks and dongles, to prevent unautho-
rized duplication of their product. But these
anti-piracy schemes lacked the flexibility, ease
of use, and inexpensive distribution that
would make them attractive to manufacturers
and end users, particularly in a networked
environment. Essentially, dongles and other
first-generation physical DRM efforts often
made computers crash — and did not actual-
ly stop copying.†
Now, software is often distributed and
licensed to the end user online. Many soft-
ware publishers rely on their license agree-
ments for legal protection of their copyrights
in order to take advantage of the new oppor-
tunities for cheap, flexible and direct software
distribution. The business software industry,
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THE STORY OF THE “DONGLE”
Many mid-1980s software programs (such as Lotus 1-2-3 and Symphony) were protected from
unauthorized use by a disk system. In order to run the program, a “key disk” had to be placed in the
user’s floppy disk drive. The idea was that key disks would not be (or could not be) duplicated by
users, and so it would be impossible to use the software on more than one machine. Before long,
however, software that unlocked these key disks was widely available. Most of the large software pub-
lishers stopped using the key disk.
A more secure system for early software protection involved the use of “dongles” — devices that
attach to a computer’s ports. These devices were expensive to manufacture and maintain, and caused
problems for users (imagine running several programs at once, each requiring its own dongle). As
with key disks, dongles could be spoofed or copied. For its time, the dongle was the most sophisticat-
ed device around for protecting against software piracy. But the software industry wound up aban-
doning dongles because the companies that made products without dongles could charge more and
still sell more copies. 
The dongle story reminds us how difficult it is to copy-protect content in a way that will not
degrade performance or otherwise defy end-user expectations. Software users may have expected
that they would be able to use software that they had paid for on different machines throughout
their homes or offices, but the dongle made such use difficult.
The dongle story provides another useful economic lesson. Consumers will pay more for a prod-
uct that provides them more capabilities or more “user” rights. And more attractive products, those
that provide more rights or capabilities, will triumph in the marketplace, in the absence of a legal
regime that prevents them from being offered.
† Direct impacts of DRM, like dongles, can include difficulty in
simply using the product, and expense passed on to the con-
sumer; indirect impacts can include hard-to-quantify public
relations negatives, such as engendering suspicion or otherwise
alienating potential customers. See, Section VI(D)(1)(e) infra.
Intuit’s product activation software for TurboTax, discontinued
by Intuit in May 2003 in response to a backlash from its cus-
tomers, is the modern software equivalent of the dongle. See,
Mark Hachman, “Intuit Will Discontinue Product Activation,”
ExtremeTech, May 14, 2003, available at <http://www.extreme-
tech.com/article2/0,3973,1088341,00.asp.>
for example, has assumed some level of un-
authorized copying (at times, as much as 40 
percent) and has moved forward, working
against unauthorized copying and, in particu-
lar, mass commercial unauthorized physical
duplication of their works offshore through
education and enforcement efforts by its
trade associations.† But they have also
changed their business model to compensate
for revenue lost from unauthorized copying.
The industry now collects a major part of its 
revenues from the sale of basic products that
are made easily transferable to other devices.
This transferability is important to software
customers. In addition, the industry relies on
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† In a June 2002 report, the Business Software Alliance estimat-
ed that the worldwide rate of software piracy in 2001 was
approximately 40%. BSA Global Piracy Study, available at
<http://www.bsa.org/usa/policyres/ admin/2002-06-
10.130.pdf.> The Business Software Alliance has focused on 
offshore, largescale, commercial copying as “piracy” that it
addresses aggressively; it distinguishes between this mass physi-
cal copying of unlicensed business application software and
personal, noncommercial copying. Interestingly, the Motion
Picture Association of America, in its Anti-Piracy materials,
makes clear that mass physical copying is a major problem for
the industry — particularly of optical discs, which are easy to
copy: “Optical Disc Piracy is major threat to the audiovisual 
sector. Pirate optical discs, which include Laser Discs (LD),
Video Compact Discs (VCD) and Digital Versatile Discs (DVD),
are inexpensive to manufacture and easy to distribute. In 2000,
over 20 million pirate optical discs were seized, and by compar-
ison, 4.5 million videos were seized worldwide in the same 
period.” Motion Picture Association of America, Anti-Piracy,
available at <http://www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy>.
Today’s VCR began as a bulky and expensive analog recording device the development of which,
by legend, was partly funded by Bing Crosby — who wanted a high quality recorder to tape his per-
formances so that he would not be held captive to live broadcast schedules.(a) Eventually, as with so
many other technologies, it became smaller and cheaper and successfully entered the consumer 
market. As this occurred, Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) President Jack Valenti told
the House Judiciary committee that “the growing and dangerous intrusion of this new technology”
threatened his entire industry’s “economic vitality and future security.” 
The MPAA and its member companies were worried enough to use litigation to attempt to shut
down the VCR industry. In the 1970s, Universal City Studios and Disney sued Sony for contributory
copyright infringement for making (and selling) Betamax VCRs. The studios argued that Sony’s
machines materially contributed to unauthorized copying of protected works — in this case, televi-
sion programs. They maintained that such copying was not “fair use” because it was “nontransforma-
tive” — no new works were being created by users, who were merely copying the works wholesale for
their own purposes. The studios also pointed out that the entire work was copied by the user. (The
amount of the work copied is a key factor in fair use analysis.) Because Sony knew or should have
known that these private infringements were taking place, it was (so the studios said) a contributory
infringer. In 1984, the Supreme Court heard the case and ruled that Sony’s actions did not constitute
contributory infringement because the VCRs were capable of substantial non-infringing uses. More
importantly for purposes of this report, however, the Court found that it was “fair use” for users to
make private, noncommercial copies for time-shifting purposes. 
The Sony decision has created a powerful presumption that private noncommercial copying of
content is fair. Beyond its legal implications, the Sony decision, and the experience of users with
copy-protected software (and, indeed, software in general) has created a consumer expectation that
noncommercial copying for backup purposes, or to time-shift or space-shift (to use at a different
time or in a different device), is acceptable. 
The VCR story illustrates how consumer expectations about a technology develop. Most con-
sumers now expect that they can make a personal copy of software in order to have a backup or for
time- or space-shifting purposes. Polls show that many people do not consider such copying wrong or
believe that personal copying (as opposed to commercial copying) has a real impact on copyright
owners. 
(a.) Investing Opportunities in Digital Media, Raymond James & Associates, February 10, 2002.
THE STORY OF THE VCR
follow-on revenues for value-added services,
particularly upgrades and support that users
need. The business model that the software
industry subsequently developed demon-
strates the utility of making available relatively
lower-cost products to establish a presence in
the marketplace (and to compete with free
unauthorized copies) in order to lay the
foundation for associated revenues from
value-added services. 
A lesson that might be drawn from these
stories is the importance of flexibility when
the Schumpeterian “winds of creative destruc-
tion” blow. New business arrangements have
consistently emerged in response to new 
technologies. Over the long term, the cre-
ators of advances in science and the arts have
profited from advances in new production
and distribution technologies. And attempts
to protect existing production and distribu-
tion arrangements by law have failed.
B. THE STRENGTH OF
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
During the first and second phases of the
copyright story, the debate about intellectual
property policy was couched in terms of
incentives for those who create new works —
authors, songwriters, artists, and performers.
Yet because the distributors of these works
collect steep rents (in economic terms) from
creators in exchange for distributing these
works, and because it is so difficult for a cre-
ator to be “heard” without the aid of a
largescale distributor, most creators receive
only a small percentage of the funds that
their works generate. Only a tiny percentage
of creators achieve the great financial rewards
that we assume accompany celebrity. 
For example, bands that record a CD for a
major label are unlikely to receive substantial
rewards, even for CDs that sell well. Their
financial incentives to record more music
(based on royalty income) are likely to be
attenuated, but having a recording marketed
by a major label recording may be important
for developing a fan base and building a per-
formance career. Few bands, in fact, can earn
a livelihood based on sales of recordings of
their performances through the present dis-
tribution system.
Royalties paid to the band by its label, the
source of direct income from the sale of CDs,
are based on retail (or wholesale) sales, rang-
ing from approximately 9-22 percent of retail
sales (more often 13-18 percent).† (They also
depend on the status and bargaining power
of the group — whether they are new, fairly
established, or highly successful).14 These
rates may be increased over the course of the
band’s career if its contract is renewed and
may be reduced over the life of a CD as it
goes from initial release (“front list”) to back
list with a reduced price.15 These royalty per-
centages, by themselves, would make royalties
among the most significant costs in the pro-
duction and sale of a CD, and potentially 
create a substantial flow of funds to the most
successful artists. But that turns out not to be
the case. 
Many artists receive an advance from the
label upon signing a recording contract.
These advances, in theory, are to be recouped
by the label from the flow of funds generated
for the artist’s royalties. If, for example, a
band were given a $1 million advance, the
first million of royalties due to the artist
would be recouped by the label. And, if the
band does not generate $1 million in royal-
ties, standard contracts do not permit the
company to get back the balance of the
advance (known as the “artist’s deficit”). So
the record company bears the risk of not
earning back the advance — a considerable
risk because, according to the industry, only
three out of ten CDs are actually successful
and only one out of ten makes a significant
profit.††
PROMOTING INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
16
† See, Merrill Lynch, Global Securities Research and
Economics Group, Global Fundamental Equity Research
Department, “Music Industry: Can Majors Control Online
Growth?” (November 2001) p.96, available at
< http://www.stern.nyu.edu/mgt/courses/b2101/lamb/down-
load/music_industry_merril_lynch.pdf>
†† Raymond James Report. The recording company may 
provide that any artist’s deficit be recouped from royalties 
from any subsequent CD released under the contract.
But the story does not end with the band
receiving its $1 million advance and the label
recouping the royalties. Royalties are not the
only costs that the recording company can
recoup. Charged against the advance are
costs of recording, including equipment
rental and travel, a substantial percentage
(often 25 percent) of the cost of producing
videos used in marketing the CD, other pro-
motional expenses paid on behalf of the
artist, and expenses associated with touring to
market the work.16
In an examination of the flow of funds in
a relatively large CD sale, Merrill Lynch esti-
mated that if a company sold 500,000 copies
of a CD at approximately $16 per copy
(retail), actual royalties paid to the artist over
his advance would amount to approximately
$88,000 out of gross revenues of $8,000,000.17
This income might be supplemented by addi-
tional royalties if the band wrote the songs
and kept the copyrights, or from royalties
paid from broadcast performances of the
music or its inclusion in other media — but it
would also have to cover the costs for the
band’s management, legal fees, and other
costs. Based on the numbers, it is difficult to
argue that the artists’ principal incentive to
create is the financial return from
recordings.† The distributors, as opposed to
the artists, are commonly the main direct
beneficiaries of these particular copyright
protections.
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† In 2002, on average, the top ten rock groups (Paul
McCartney, the Rolling Stones, etc.) received only 17% of 
their income from recording, and 66% of their income from
touring. Richard E. Howard, ATT.
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With the VCR and dongle era behind us,
we are entering a third phase of the copyright
story. This phase is characterized by the rise
of electronic networks, the digitization of
content, and the prevalence of licensing mod-
els (as compared to ownership of creative
objects) for the distribution of digital goods.
Digitization plus compression plus high band-
width equals, in the eyes of investors in
expensive proprietary content (normally
those who distribute rather than create such
content), a nightmare scenario: simply mak-
ing available a work in digital form may guar-
antee that someone can make a copy of it
and give it to a friend or share it with
200,000,000 buddies they have never met. 
At the same time, user expectations about
what was reasonable under intellectual prop-
erty law evolved during the second phase.
Millions of people now are used to time-shift-
ing and space-shifting: taping shows or burn-
ing CDs so that they can take their music with
them and play it on whatever playback unit is
available. These second-phase user expecta-
tions have survived the introduction of third-
phase technologies, and copyright owners are
justifiably worried.
A. THE CHALLENGE OF THE
THIRD PHASE
In an era of physical distribution of con-
tent “objects” (such as books, movies, and
music saved on physical media), creators (or
other rights-holders) could divide the bundle
of intellectual property rights both geographi-
cally and temporally with some assurance that
the divisions would be meaningful. Thus, the
release of a book in Germany would not nec-
essarily dictate that copies would “leak” into
the U.S. in great numbers. The physical diffi-
culty and cost involved in copying, crating,
and shipping books militated against easy or
widespread piracy. And the economic costs of
the leakage were sufficiently limited that dis-
tributors did not feel directly threatened.
Now, in the digital era, the friction and
cost that were involved in copying physical
content-goods no longer are limiting factors.
All a person has to do now is save a file to a
publicly accessible folder on his or her hard
drive, where it can be redistributed to other
users via peer-to-peer file sharing services. Or
that person can email the file as an attach-
ment to a message sent to many people. Or
that person can upload the file to a personal
web page and make it visible to the world.
The capability of the Internet to allow world-
wide, instantaneous, cost-free distribution of
perfect, non-degradeable copies makes the
digital world frightening to owners of high-
investment content. At the same time, such
copyright-owners are deeply aware of the dis-
tribution benefits the Internet may provide,
as long as they are able to maintain control
over their works.
It is becoming clearer to many that intel-
lectual property may be as different from real
property as intangible objects are different
from tangible objects. As Chairman
Greenspan recently said,
[T]he nature of intellectual property is
importantly different from physical property.
In particular, one individual’s use of an
idea does not make that idea unavailable to
others for their own, simultaneous use.
Further-more, new ideas almost invariably
build on old ideas in ways that are difficult
or impossible to delineate. From an economic
perspective, this provides a rationale for
making the calculus, developed initially by
Leibnitz and Newton, freely available,
despite the fact that those insights have
immeasurably increased wealth over the 
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V. COPYRIGHT BACKGROUND: 
THIRD PHASE
generations. Should we have protected their
claim in the same way that we do for owners
of land? Or should the law make their
insights more freely available to those who
would build on them, with the aim of maxi-
mizing the wealth of the society as a whole?
Are all property rights inalienable, or must
they conform to a reality that conditions
them? 18
But how to acknowledge this difference
between property and intellectual property,
and what this difference means for copyright
policy, is a hard problem. As with the devel-
opment of the printing press so many years
ago, a new means of storing, displaying and
distributing information (or knowledge) is
becoming widespread: digitization. Now, in
the Internet age, the content industry sees
digitization accompanied by the threat of
“Napsterization.” 
The idea of Napster came from its creator
Shawn Fanning in 1998. Mr. Fanning, while
still an undergraduate at Northeastern
University, created programs that permitted
people to locate and transfer files in real time
— something that traditional search engines
did not allow — and to log on and update
lists of MP3 (compressed music) files. By May
1999, Mr. Fanning’s idea developed into a
full-blown operation and an incorporated
entity, Napster Inc., which allowed users to
swap music with each other by using a search
option that found the songs requested and
then allowed downloads from other users at
no cost. Napster’s popularity grew quickly.
The music industry successfully prosecut-
ed Napster — and because the Napster serv-
ice had become a centralized, incorporated
entity with proprietary software, it was an easy
target. Napster was ordered to prevent its
users from sharing tunes without paying the
copyright-holders. When Napster was eventu-
ally disabled, people were forced to move
their music file-sharing to more sophisticated
P2P programs that did not rely on centralized
databases but instead directly connected users
to each other: Gnutella, Aimster, Morpheus,
and Freenet. 
There are now over 130 different P2P pro-
grams. The majority of the files downloaded
are MP3 music files. According to the
research firm The Yankee Group, about five
billion music files were downloaded in 2002.19
But P2P users are also swapping files of
movies, television shows, and video games.
About five million video games were down-
loaded in 2002, and about three million tele-
vision shows are downloaded each day from
KaZaa alone.† 20
The music industry argues that it has been
grievously hurt by the widespread online shar-
ing of audio files, first by way of Napster and
then via Napster’s more decentralized proge-
ny. The most telling statistic is the decline,
over the last three years, of music sales: a 5
percent drop in 2000 and 2001, and a further
7 percent drop in 2002.†† 21 According to the
industry, these declines, the first in two
decades of uninterrupted growth, can be
attributed in part to the enormous increase
in file- sharing, imperiling the industry and
foreshadowing a future marked by less and
less creation, the successful emergence of
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† On December 19, 2003, the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands upheld a lower court’s ruling that Kazaa’s creators
could not be held liable for the infringing actions of Kazaa’s
users. Joris Evers, “Dutch Supreme Court Rules Kazaa Legal,”
December 19, 2003, available at
<http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/pcworld/
20031219/tc_pcworld/113968>.
†† See also, International Federation of the Phonogram
Industry, available at <http://news.com.com2100-1027-
966205.html>.
“The industry would not be able to 
produce and market the number of new
artists it’s offered historically. It would
mean far less investment in music. Record
companies make money by selling
music…If they can’t sell music because
people are downloading or burning it for
free, they’ll take fewer risks on fewer
artists.” 
Cary Sherman, President of the Recording
Industry Association of America
fewer and fewer artists, and a precipitous
reduction in the music available to us all. 
A closer look at the state of the music
industry supports the view that offline piracy
— the massive copying of the physical media
in which form most listeners receive recorded
music — and online file-sharing of copyright-
ed material have damaged the financial per-
formance of the industry. According to
Merrill Lynch, CD burning and ripping are
serious threats. Physical piracy, however,
accounts for losses of approximately 10 per-
cent of revenues of the music recording 
market and roughly a third of the total in
unit sales.22
Other factors have also contributed sub-
stantially. Over the last two decades there
have been several periods of decline or 
stagnant growth in this fundamentally cyclic
industry — not surprisingly (for the sale of
discretionary products) correlated with bad
economic conditions.†
In the period from 1980-1984, the music
market contracted at a compounded annual
growth rate of -4.1 percent due, according to
Merrill Lynch, to a recession and to copying
associated with music on audiotapes.†† 1985-
1995 was another period of strong growth,
similar to the period between 1969-1979,
both of which were marked by growth stimu-
lated by new distribution media — first of 
cassette players, then CD players.23 1995-2000
was another stagnant period, with a 1.5 per-
cent compounded annual growth rate decline
(although the strong dollar affected these
results and there was a slight increase in local
currencies).24 The recessionary effects of the
early 1990s were masked by strong CD 
revenues resulting from the replacement of
vinyl libraries. This changeout has largely
occurred and is no longer stimulating sales.25
Other factors appear to be playing a part
in recent revenue declines experienced by
the music industry. The consolidation of own-
ership of radio outlets and the increasing
importance of mass market retailers (as
opposed to specialty stores), who have dou-
bled their share of the market, has led to a
smaller number of artists receiving air play
and having their materials available to a mass
audience.26 The industry significantly reduced
the number of new releases from 38,900 in
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† Overall, the evidence is mixed with respect to the impact of
downloading on record label sales. On July 9, 2003, Claire
Smith of The Scotsman reported, “Far from damaging the
music industry, downloading music from the Internet can be a
useful and significant marketing tool.” On November 4, 2002,
Amy Harmon of the New York Times reported that independ-
ent bands were experimenting with promoting their wares on
file-trading services, and that “an executive at a major record
company said that he and many colleagues would like to use 
[a free file-sharing service] to distribute their material but that
their lawyers would not allow it.” Reuters reported on June 15,
2003 that Sony Music had decided not to make downloads
available for sale to European Internet users — but would sell
downloads in Britain, “making it the last among the major
recording labels to join Europe’s music download bandwagon.”
†† Raymond James Report. Chart reflects dollars adjusted for
inflation.
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1999 to between 27,000 and 31,000 in 2001
— a 20-25 percent drop.† Cyclical changes in
musical tastes also seem to have had an
impact. Even prior to Napster, the industry
was experiencing a substantial decline in
1995-2000 sales to 14-19 year-olds, traditional-
ly its highest-spending group.27 In addition,
during the boom years of the 1990s the
industry continued to raise prices, with the
average CD increasing in cost from approxi-
mately $12 to $15.28 This overall price
increase may well have affected sales as the
U.S. entered an economic downturn —
indeed, the industry has continued to raise
prices in the 2000s.†† Another factor may have
been fierce competition for the discretionary
consumer entertainment dollar: DVD sales
rose by 61 percent in 2002, and video games
are competing directly for the attention of
the crucial 14-19 year old purchaser.≠ 29
Whatever the causes of the decline in 
the music distribution business, the movie
industry has taken the experience of
Napsterization to heart. As the MPAA has 
stated:
While the Internet and Broadband services
have great potential, they can also cause
enormous losses and damage to consumers,
telecommunications services, and the compa-
nies that produce and distribute content for
those businesses. Audiovisual work piracy
and cable theft have always been problemat-
ic; however, the digital world is far more
dangerous than the analog world.
In the digital world, pirates can download
everything from USA Networks’ original pro-
gram to episodes of “Jerry Seinfeld” for their
own use or to provide to countless others.
Moreover, the 1,000th copy of a digitized
movie or television program is as pure as the
original, whereas in analog each copy is
degraded in quality. Thus with a single key-
stroke, a computer pirate can do millions of
dollars worth of damage to the potential
market for television programming or motion
pictures, whether or not the pirate makes a
nickel from this effort. No one will pay for
cable television or movies when they are
available for free on the Internet. ...30
But in contrast to the recording industry,
which has recorded three consecutive years of
declining sales, the movie business continues
to grow. While the MPAA points to millions of
downloads of a new movie release, even
before its official opening, movie box office
receipts grew 13.5 percent in 2002 — the best
year-over-year performance in two decades.
Growth in other media used for movie distri-
bution was also dramatic. And revenues from
videocassettes, the technology that was to
have threatened the very security of the
movie industry, exceeded box office receipts
by $2 billion.
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† See BusinessWeek.com article: “The industry released 27,000
new titles in 2001, according to a speech made by an RIAA offi-
cial, a 25% drop from the high of 38,900 in 1999. The RIAA
disputes Ziemann’s analysis, saying it hasn’t released an official
tally of annual new releases since 1999. Industry-research firm
Nielsen SoundScan has run the numbers, however, and the
RIAA doesn’t dispute its findings. According to SoundScan,
new releases in 2001 totaled around 31,734, still a 20.3% drop.”
Releases rose to 33,443 in 2002, but that’s still 14% below the
1999 record. “The music industry’s [modus operandi] is to
throw things against the wall and see what sticks,” says Nathan
Brackett, senior editor at Rolling Stone. “If they’re throwing
20% less stuff out there, there’s less chance something will
stick.” See also, Stan Liebowitz, “Will MP3 Downloads
Annihilate the Recording Industry? The Evidence So Far,” 
June 2003 (concluding that MP3 downloads cannot be blamed
for all of the drop in unit sales the muic industry has experi-
enced; decline in sales of CD singles and cassettes, which has
continued in the past three years, began long before Napster),
available at
<http://wwwpub.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/intprop/records.pdf.>
†† In a sharp departure from the practices of the rest of the
music industry, in September 2003 Universal Music Group
dropped the price of its CDs, offering a $12.98 suggested retail
price on all of its top-line CDs sold in the United States. See,
<http://maccentral.macworld.com/news/2003/09/05/umg/>;
<http://www.pro- music.org/viewpoints/speech290703.htm.>
The average price for a CD (excluding promotion CDs sold
through record clubs or nonmusic stores) rose from $14.31 in
1998 to $17.02 in 2002.
<http://www.azoz.com/news2/math01.html.> Cary Sherman of
the RIAA has confirmed that prices have been raised to keep
revenue figures high. 
≠ A recent Forrester report suggests that even if peer-to-peer
file sharing goes away, the end of the domination of physical
media distribution methods may be just around the corner.
Devices are becoming so small and have so much memory that
buying CDs and other physical media objects may soon no
longer make sense to consumers. Forrester Tech Strategy
Report: From Discs to Downloads (August 2003) (predicting
that 33% of music sales will be made through downloads by
2008).
But the MPAA is correct in seeing a pro-
found threat to its present forms of distribu-
tion. The costs of production for creative
works (particularly extraordinarily costly
works, like movies) are likely to remain high,
while the marginal cost of copying and dis-
tributing digital versions of these works may
someday become very low. As Alan
Greenspan recently pronounced: 
[I]n the physical world, the usual situation
is that each additional unit of output is
more costly to produce than the previous one;
that is, production, at least eventually, is
characterized by increasing marginal cost.
By contrast, in the conceptual world, much
of production is characterized by constant,
and perhaps even zero, marginal cost. For
example, though the set up cost of creating
an on-line encyclopedia may be enormous,
the cost of reproduction and distribution
may be near zero if the means of distribution
is the Internet.31
Clearly the movie distribution industry’s
future contains many of the same challenges
faced by the music distribution industry. 
Whatever the true impacts of the move-
ment to digitization and the growth of com-
puterized networks, it is beyond question that
those industries that have relied on the physi-
cal distribution of copyrighted materials —
previously in analog form, and now in digital
— believe they have a critical problem that
must be attacked on all fronts, domestic and
international, legislative and regulatory,
through education, standard setting, and liti-
gation. 
B. WHAT ARE THE PROPOSED
SOLUTIONS FOR THE
THIRD PHASE?
The advent of any new technology (like
the advent of the printing press, photocopy-
ing machine, and VCR) presents a profound
challenge to rights-holders. One answer is the
“dongle” approach — finding technical
means of locking content down. Such techni-
cal approaches often have such undesirable
direct and indirect impacts on users that pub-
lishers realize that they are not worth the
“lock-down” benefit. A second answer is the
VCR approach — finding legal means of lock-
ing down the machines that facilitate access
to the content. But such legalistic approaches
may not work if there are good (“substantially
noninfringing”) uses for the machine in ques-
tion, as in the Sony case, or if some inventive
technologist finds a way around the legally
mandated solution.
A variety of steps (both of the “dongle”
and “VCR” variety) have been proposed over
the last few years that have been intended to
combat the perceived threat of online copy-
right infringement:
• major Congressional legislative 
initiatives;
• a proceeding before the FCC to deter-
mine whether broadcast television
receivers and other devices capable of
providing access to video signals should
respond to a “broadcast flag” by pre-
venting retransmission of “flagged”
material over the Internet;
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Digital Rights Management (DRM) refers
to technologies and services that allow digital
content providers to regulate the use of
copy-protected products, such as photo-
graphs, books, music, and videos. DRM 
systems often use encryption to restrict
access to digital content to authorized users.
Additionally, some DRM systems enable con-
tent providers to monitor the activity of the
authorized user via electronic “marking”
devices to prevent altering, copying, or shar-
ing of content on different machines. DRM
technologies may be embedded in the soft-
ware of digital content or the hardware of a
device.
DRM technologies give content providers
more control over their intellectual property
assets. By controlling file access and distribu-
tion, content providers can sell (collect pay-
ments for) more units of digital copy-protect-
ed material by preventing unauthorized
duplication.
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
• ratification by the FCC of an agree-
ment between the cable industry and
the movie studios;
• creation of digital rights management
protections; and
• initiation of cross-industry groups
studying the question of online copy-
right infringement and making recom-
mendations for copy protection tech-
nologies. 
The next sections of this report examine
the various approaches (legislative, regulato-
ry, and contractual) that have been proposed
or implemented. We will look at the impact
on innovation of each of these approaches,
and their relationship to the current societal
balance between control and access to infor-
mation, as well as to consumer expectations
that have arisen over the last two decades.
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A. LEGISLATION
1. The DMCA
Any discussion of legislative activity begins
with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), enacted into law in 1998 “to make
digital networks safe places to disseminate
and exploit copyrighted materials.”32 The
DMCA set the stage for efforts to protect digi-
tal information from unauthorized copying
by recognizing that copyright-holders might
employ technological protection measures to
control access to their works. Section
1201(a)(1)(A) of the Act outlaws circumven-
tion of “effective” technical measures used by
copyright owners to protect access to their
works (subject to a few exceptions).† The Act
also includes provisions making it illegal to
“make, import, offer to the public, provide or
otherwise traffic in technologies that bypass
access controls” (Section 1201(a)(2)), or to
make technologies that bypass “other techni-
cal protection measures” used by copyright-
owners to protect a right in their works
(Section 1201(b)(1)). 
Significantly, the DMCA has another ele-
ment that addresses directly the risk that the
law would be read to mandate certain techni-
cal protection measures for a broad range of
devices. The Act states that manufacturers of
computers and consumer electronics prod-
ucts have no obligation to ensure that their
devices respond to particular copy protection
technical measures (Section 1201(c)).†† This
key section of the DMCA is known as the “no
tech mandate” clause.
The DMCA has several other components
that were the result of extended debate over
the responsibilities of third parties who might
be involved in unauthorized access to and 
distribution of copyrighted materials.
Traditionally, companies that provided
telecommunications services did so as “com-
mon carriers,” transmitting all communica-
tions presented to them, without liability for
the content of the materials that carried. The
new question answered by the DMCA was
how copyright law would treat the category of
companies that provided access to the
Internet (online service providers) or that
hosted web pages that could be accessed via
the Internet — who, under classic copyright
law, would be liable for copyright infringe-
ment for passive “copying” of protected con-
tent. Under the DMCA, companies acting as
“mere conduits” (e.g., facilitating email
exchanges) have essentially no liability for
infringements originated by subscribers.
Companies providing “hosting” services for
sites they do not control will also not be sub-
ject to copyright infringement liability if they
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VI. DISCUSSION OF “SOLUTIONS” FOR 
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
† According to the Home Recording Rights Coalition, “The
legislative history of the DMCA indicates that Congress intend-
ed to require minimum attributes for measures to be deemed
“effective,” and thus to trigger DMCA obligations. On the occa-
sion of initial passage of the DMCA by the House of
Representatives, Chairman Tom Bliley, on behalf of the House
Commerce Committee, addressed the meaning of “effectively
protects” in the context of section 1201(b): ‘Section
1201(b)(2) of H.R. 2281 defines important phrases, including
when a protection measure “effectively protects a right of a
copyright owner under title 17, United States Code.” In our
view, the measures that would be deemed to “effectively” pro-
tect such rights would be those based on encryption, scram-
bling, authentication, or some other measure which requires
the use of a “key” to copy a work.’” Congressional Record,
105th Congress, August 4, 1998, H7094. Home Recording
Rights Coalition, “When Is A “Technological Measure”
“Effective” And When Is Compliance Mandated?” available at
<http://www.hrrc.org/global_include/asp/technological_meas
ure.asp>.
†† The Act does feature a mandate for manufacturers of VCRs
to use Macrovision (which prevents VCR-to-VCR copying) in
their devices (Section 1201(K)), but that is a narrow agreement
with respect to analog technology that was specifically agreed to
in exchange for the broader “no tech mandate” clause for the
digital world.
cooperate with a detailed process set forth in
the DMCA by which rights holders notify
them of infringements and they take down
the offending site. Operators of websites
(individuals actually and actively responsible
for content on these sites) remain subject to
normal liability under existing copyright law.
For the purposes of this report, the most
important sections of the Act are the anti-
circumvention provisions. The Act prohibits
the manufacture or distribution of any prod-
uct or service that is primarily designed or
produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that controls access to
a copyrighted work, and prohibits the manu-
facture or distribution of any product or 
service that is primarily designed or produced
for the purpose of circumventing protection
afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner. 
But the DMCA provides some exceptions
to these sweeping provisions. For example,
the DMCA permits the act of circumvention
and circumvention devices for critical activi-
ties such as achieving interoperability, encryp-
tion research, and security testing. The
DMCA also establishes a rulemaking proceed-
ing under which the Library of Congress can
establish additional exceptions upon finding
that users of a particular class of copyrighted
works are likely to be adversely affected by
their inability to make noninfringing uses of
the works. A critical question for those who
care about the public domain is the relation-
ship among the provisions that criminalize
attempts to gain access to material protected
by technical means, the expectations and
practices of users who have grown used to
time- and space-shifting content, and the
legal regimes created to ensure access to
copyright material such as fair use. Many con-
sumer advocates and scholars have focused
on these questions.†
As part of recent attempts to prevent
unauthorized access and distribution of copy-
righted materials, attempts are being made
to pass legislation at the state level.
Proponents claim that the legislation will
update the DMCA to help combat digital
piracy and that new “criminal and civil penal-
ties against Internet pirates and hackers of
communications services” at the state level
are “an essential tool to complement
resource-limited activity at the federal
level.”33 While the proposed legislation large-
ly duplicates the DMCA, it omits key excep-
tions and limitations inserted by Congress to
permit legitimate activities such as circum-
vention for particular purposes — encryption
research, security testing, and interoperabil-
ity — as well as the explicit disavowal of a
generalized tech mandate discussed above.
By excluding these limitations, the proposed
state legislation strikes a very different bal-
ance than that found in the DMCA, and may
harm technology companies, universities,
libraries, and users. Additionally, although
these proposed (and in some cases, enacted)
state bills are described as “theft of service”
legislation, they would potentially subject
consumers and manufacturers to criminal
penalties and fines for attaching to their
broadband connections otherwise lawful
devices (e.g., TiVos) that have not been
“approved” by the broadband service
provider — who might be offering a compet-
ing device. Under these bills, liability could
be found based on a subjective “intent to
defraud” standard. Given the legal risks cre-
ated by these new bills, and the service
provider approvals that might be required,
manufacturers and retailers might choose
not to produce or sell such devices, chilling
the market for innovative applications. As of
the date of the drafting of this report, state
“super-DMCA” bills have been passed or are
under consideration in Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, 
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† See, e.g., materials collected at <www.eff.org, www.public-
knowledge.org>, and Professor Pamela Samuelson’s articles 
collected at
<http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers.html>.
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia.†
2. The Hollings Bill
In 2002, Sen. Hollings introduced his
Consumer Broadband and Digital Television
Promotion Act. In contrast to the DMCA’s “no
tech mandate” direction, the Hollings bill, S.
2048, would have allowed the FCC to man-
date a security standard protective of digital
content for all digital media devices; if the
private sector was unable to agree to a stan-
dard on its own, the government was to devel-
op one. Under the bill, it would have been
illegal to make or provide a “digital media
device” that did not contain such standard
security measures (or to remove such meas-
ures). Proponents of the Hollings bill argued
that the growth and development of digital
content (and broadband deployment general-
ly) was being stalled by the absence of protec-
tion systems. They suggested that digital con-
tent would not be secure and would not be
made available for distribution until some
form of digital rights management system
(DRM) was installed in all devices capable of
displaying digital content — from TV sets to
personal digital assistants to wristwatch cell-
phones to general purpose computers. They
insisted that the consumer electronics and
information technology industries would not
voluntarily accede to DRM usage, because it
would add costs to the devices without provid-
ing consumers with what they would perceive
to be added value, and that therefore the gov-
ernment must mandate the inclusion of
DRMs. The Hollings bill has not yet been
reintroduced in the 108th Congress.
3. The Berman Bill
On July 25, 2002, Rep. Howard Berman
(D-CA) introduced a bill that would permit
copyright-owners to employ self-help tech-
nologies when their copyrighted works are
infringed on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks.
The bill, known as the Berman bill, was
intended to enable the music and movie
industries to legally use interdiction, decoys,
redirection, file blocking, spoofs, or other
technological tools to prevent P2P piracy, but
gave them immunity from criminal and civil
liability for such acts. The bill did not require
the copyright-owner to give advance (or sub-
sequent) notice to its target that it was plan-
ning to employ self-help measures. 
In support of his bill, Rep. Berman said,
“the primary current application of P2P net-
works is unbridled copyright piracy. P2P
downloads today consist largely of copyright-
ed music, and as download speeds improve,
there has been a marked increase in P2P
downloads of copyrighted software, games,
photographs, karaoke tapes, and movies.”
The Berman bill was clearly intended to
enable the music and movie industries to
shut down the sorts of rampant copying that
the court in the Napster case found to consti-
tute infringement. However, the bill was writ-
ten with language broad enough to encom-
pass a variety of other scenarios, and provid-
ed broad discretion to parties using self-help
measures. Many things other than movies are
protected by copyright — like educational
and political materials — and the bill
required only that the copyright owner mere-
ly have a “reasonable basis to believe” that
his/her materials had been infringed. And
the right of self help provided for by the
Berman bill could be exercised by a copy-
right-holder to stop the dissemination of con-
tent that the copyright-owner had not sold,
thus preventing the dissemination of expres-
sion. While the scope of the actions that
would be protected by the safe harbor provi-
sion was not specified in the Berman bill, and
while it was stated that all the actions that
would be protected were lawful, there was
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† Similar efforts are proceeding at the government-to-govern-
ment level: On May 6, 2003, President Bush and Prime
Minister Goh of Singapore signed the U.S.-Singapore Free
Trade Agreement (the “FTA”), which requires Singapore to
implement DMCA-like anti-circumvention provisions. The FTA
does not contain any of the DMCA’s exceptions to the scope of
digital protections for copyrighted works. Brandy Karl,
“Enforcing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Internationally: Why Congress Shouldn’t Lock in the Current
DMCA By Approving the Current Version of the U.S.-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement,” (May 15, 2003) available at
<http://writ.news.findlaw.com/student/20030519_karl.html>.
considerable concern that self-help activities
would interfere with legitimate uses of com-
puters or other devices and that the bill
would immunize those who engaged in such
actions from damage that they might cause.
One information technology association
rejected “the premise of this bill that content
owners should be entitled to ‘vigilante justice’
for suspected copyright violations.”34 The bill
was not passed in the 107th Congress. 
In February 2003, Rep. Berman
announced that he might not reintroduce his
bill, because copyright-holders may not need
extra protection to combat file-sharing piracy.
Also, Hollywood’s support for the bill was
weakened by Rep. Berman’s plan to impose
new liabilities on copyright-holders that went
too far in attacking pirates.†
4. “Fair Use” Bills
At the other end of the spectrum, bills
were introduced at the end of the 107th
Congress that attempted to bolster the rights
of end users and creators who rely on existing
copyrighted works. 
Boucher-Doolittle. On January 7, 2003, Rep.
Rick Boucher (D-VA) and Rep. John Doolittle
(R-CA) re-introduced the Digital Media
Consumers’ Rights Act (DMCRA).
To date, the Copyright Office has not
allowed an exemption from the DMCA’s anti-
circumvention provision for those who cir-
cumvent a technological lock in order to
make a non-infringing use (such as a use per-
mitted by the copyright law for fair use, class-
room, preservation or similar provisions) of a 
lawfully acquired copyrighted work. Boucher-
Doolittle would amend Section 1201 of the
DMCA to allow circumvention of a technolog-
ical measure that controls access to and use
of a copyrighted act, if the circumvention
does not result in infringement of the work.
The bill would also decriminalize anti-circum-
vention tools when the tools have substantial
non-infringing uses and broaden allowances
for anti-circumvention scientific research.
Boucher-Doolittle would also require record
companies to label CDs that were copy-pro-
tected or that would not play on certain
devices (such as PCs).
Lofgren. On Oct. 3, 2002, Representative
Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) introduced H.R. 5522,
the Digital Choice and Freedom Act of 2002. The
bill would amend the Copyright Act to allow
consumers to use CDs, DVDs and other digi-
tal works on the devices of their choice and
to sell or lend their personal copies of digital
works. Rep. Lofgren explained that her bill
“encourages content owners to respect con-
sumer rights and expectations by permitting
circumvention tools if they fail to do so.” The
bill also provides that terms in nonnegotiated
licenses (“shrinkwrap” or “clickwrap” licens-
es) that restrict rights of users under the
Copyright Act will not be enforceable.††
B. REGULATION: THE
BROADCAST FLAG
For several years, the FCC has been engag-
ing in reviewing proposals for a “broadcast
flag.” Providers of video content want to
avoid being “Napsterized” by online file-
traders and proposed to mark video content
with a short digital tag (the “broadcast flag”);
machines receiving digital television content
would be required to recognize this tag and
ensure, by way of new forms of enforcement
software, that the content is not subject to
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† On May 4, 2003, The New York Times reported that “[s]ome
of the world’s biggest record companies, facing rampant online
piracy, are quietly financing the development and testing of
software programs that would sabotage the computers and
Internet connections of people that download pirated music.”
Andrew Ross Sorkin, “Software Bullet Is Sought to Kill Musical
Piracy,” The New York Times, May 4, 2003. Industry spokespeople
have said publicly that, just as the “left” believes it has a right to
hack overly protective DRM measures, the content industry
believes it also has a right to use self-help. Prof. Lawrence
Lessig of Stanford Law School stated that “Some of this stuff is
going to be illegal...It depends on if they are doing a sufficient
amount of damage. The law has ways to deal with copyright
infringement. Freezing people’s computers is not within the
scope of the copyright laws.”
†† In a related development, in September 2003 Sen. Sam
Brownback (R.-Kan.) introduced legislation directed at curbing
the DMCA-provided ability of copyright owners to obtain iden-
tity information about ISP subscribers without judicial supervi-
sion. Roy Mark, “Brownback Bill Aims to Curb DMCA
Subpoena Powers,” DC.Internet.com, September 17, 2003.
any “unauthorized use” — and, in particular,
is not transmitted either over the Internet or
over insufficiently secure wired connections
inside one’s home.†
While the objective of blocking Internet
transmission seems simple, what ultimately
would be needed to implement this goal is a
government mandate that would require that
all devices that touch digital broadcast con-
tent be “compliant” (possessed of approved
technology to prevent unauthorized use of
content) and sufficiently “robust” (secure and
nontamperable). Like the Hollings bill, the
broadcast flag regime, as proposed, would
apply to “downstream devices” which include
a broad range of machines — anything capa-
ble of receiving or storing or copying digital
broadcast content, such as PCs, televisions, or
mobile phones.††
In November 2003, the FCC issued its first
order in its broadcast flag rulemaking.35
Supporting the flag proposal, the FCC
required that devices that receive digital tele-
vision broadcasts sold after July 2005 must
include content protection technologies
approved by the government. The first order
left unresolved a number of important
issues—-who will approve the technologies,
using what criteria, and what uses (e.g. copy-
ing, time and space-shifting, sharing, sending
over the Internet) of flagged content will be
allowed, including what use will be permitted
in a “personal digital network environ-
ment”—- which will be considered in a subse-
quent rulemaking. Judicial challenges to the 
FCC’s jurisdiction to issue this first order are
expected. In recent months, there have been
several Congressional hearings on the broad-
cast flag, and it is likely that broad legislation
on this subject will be introduced in the next
few months. 
Plugging the “analog hole.” The broadcast
flag proceeding concerns locking down digi-
tal outputs of devices only, and does not con-
strain analog outputs. This means that
“flagged” digital material could be captured
from an analog output such as one contained
in an analog video display device (e.g., a
VCR), transformed into high-quality analog
form, and then redigitized — in the process,
the “flag” being considered by the FCC would
be lost, and the result of this digital-analog-
digital conversion would be a high-quality file
that was available for perfect and unlimited
digital copying and transmission with no
“flag” attached. The content industry is con-
cerned that control needs to be extended to
any outlet through which digital material
could “leak” into analog form without the
flag and then be redigitized — in popular
parlance, they believe that they have to plug
the “analog hole.” In an April 2002 “Content
Protection Status Report” provided to the
Senate Judiciary Committee by the Motion
Picture Association of America, the MPAA
said that analog-to-digital converters needed
to be regulated to ensure that they responded
to a “watermarking” technology that would
survive digital to analog conversion. This is a
very broad goal, because analog-to-digital
converters are present in any number of
machines — including digital scanners, sam-
plers, thermometers, seismographs, computer
pointing devices, camcorders, cameras,
microscopes, telescopes, modems, radios, 
televisions, cellular phones, walkie-talkies,
and many other devices.
For the process of plugging the analog
hole to proceed, a watermarking technology
will need to be chosen that survives digital-
analog-digital conversion. Led by the MPAA,
the information technology, consumer elec-
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† As currently constituted, the 5C suite of technologies that are
anticipated to be approved copy protection technologies under
the broadcast flag regulation would not allow wireless transmis-
sion, even within the home although new proposals for protect-
ing wireless transmission have been put forward.
†† Mobile phones capable of showing analog television are just
beginning to hit the market. E.g., the Samsung SGH-P705 is a
phone and an NTSC television. Cellular telephones that can
receive terrestrial digital television broadcasts will be marketed
in December 2003 in three major Japanese cities; See 3G,
(press release, “3G Phones Evolve in the Ubiquitous Era,”
London, England: October 9, 2003), available at
<http://www.3g.co.uk/PR/Oct2003/5934.htm>.
tronics, and entertainment industries formed
a discussion group in February 2003 (the
Analog Reconversion Discussion Group) to
work on this issue.
Cable/CE MOU. Recently, the cable servic-
es and consumer electronics industries devel-
oped a framework for plug-and-play compati-
bility among consumer devices that can
receive cable services. A proposed agreement,
the Memorandum of Understanding Among Cable
MSOs and Consumer Electronics Manufacturers,
was considered by the FCC.36 The draft agree-
ment outlined “encoding rules” (statements
about how many and what kinds of copies
consumers will be able to make using
approved technologies) that prohibited or
constrained copying of commercial content
received over a cable system regardless of
whether such copying posed a security threat
or a copyright infringement. For example,
the MOU’s encoding rules would have pro-
hibited time-shifting of a pay-per-view pro-
gram. In general, the encoding scheme pre-
sented in the MOU would have limited copy-
ing to a greater degree than it is limited with
current consumer electronics or computer
equipment. Additionally, the draft MOU
locked in a particular group of content-pro-
tection technologies (the 5C suite of tech-
nologies) and thus might have locked some
players out of the marketplace. 
The FCC was asked to define “digital
cable-ready” to mean that a given device used
the 5C suite of technologies. Thus, if the
MOU was approved by the FCC in the form it
was proposed, only machines that used this
particular proprietary content-protection
technology would have been able to call
themselves “digital cable-ready.” In the 5C
world, once flagged content is recognized by
a 5C compliant device, it cannot be transmit-
ted to (or played on, or copied by) any non-
compliant legacy device. So if 5C had been
the endorsed technology, consumers would
have been able to copy and play content only
on 5C devices. For many consumers, this might
have meant substantial (and perhaps surpris-
ing) required upgrading of much of the con-
sumer electronic and computing based tech-
nologies in their homes. As of the date of the
preparation of this report, the FCC had
issued an initial Order with respect to this
“plug and play” MOU, saying that consumers
will still need a set-top box to receive two-way
services such as video on demand, impulse
pay-per-view and cable operator-enhanced
electronic programming guides.37 The FCC
noted that the cable and consumer electron-
ics industries continue to work on the devel-
opment of an agreement for two-way “plug
and play” receivers that would eliminate the
need for a set-top box to receive these
advanced cable services. Thus, the FCC has
approved a baseline “cable ready” standard
that connotes a oneway download ability to
view digital video programming, but has not
yet established rules for two-way interactivity.
The cable and consumer electronics
industries also filed a model license for the
5C-based scrambling technology, which pro-
tects content from unauthorized use. The
FCC concluded that, “given the importance
of these products as a portal into consumers’
homes for content in the digital age, further
consideration of how innovations and
changes [under this license] should be
approved was warranted.”38 The Plug and Play
Order initiated a Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) to examine
these issues. This means that the FCC has
decided to look hard at the licenses covering
copy-protection technology in the cable con-
text, to determine whether consumer-friendly
protections (such as protection for “Betamax-
like” fair use) are included in these licenses.
Because the FCC will have an oversight role
in the approval of new outputs and content
protection technologies under this MOU, the
Commission will be able to ensure that PCs
and other devices with open architectures
and alternative copy-protection schemes are
included in the DTV transition. Several
Parties, including the MPAA and the National
Cable Television Association, have asked the
FCC to reconsider portions of the Plug and
Play Order.
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C. PRIVATE DRM
Private DRM efforts have been underway
for some time, as evidenced by the early
“dongle” attempts in the 1980s. There are,
generally, two levels of protecting content
through technology: restricting duplication of
the content, and implementing access con-
trols that ensure that only valid, authenticat-
ed users can use the content. DVD and CD
protection are examples of the former; the
Trusted Computing Platform Alliance is an
example of the latter.
DVDs and CDs. In 1995-1996, an inter-
industry group pooled their patents, formed
the DVD Copy Control Association, and
agreed on a Content Scrambling System
(CSS) encryption technology that all devices
touching DVD content would have to use.
Under the DVD CCA licensing regime, instal-
lation of CSS is required (as is adherence to a
DVD CCA license) in order for decryption of
DVDs to legally occur in any device. DVD play-
ers need CSS circuitry to be able to decode
and play the contents of these discs. And to
play on computers’ DVD-ROM drives, the
DVD-decoder hardware and software need to
include a CSS decryption module. No person-
al use copying of DVDs is permitted by CSS. 
CSS was successfully hacked in 1999 with
the creation of DeCSS. DeCSS allows a DVD
to be played on a Linux machine. No Linux
DVD players were available on the market at
the time DeCSS was created — so DeCSS
filled a gap perceived by Linux users†.
Additionally, DVD movies are often
region-protected, so that (for example) DVDs
coded “region one” (US and Canada) will not
play anywhere else in the world. This vestige
of the distribution regimes established for
physical goods has also been successfully
hacked.
Recently, Disney announced that it will be
“renting” DVDs beginning in August 2003.
These so-called “EZ-D” DVDs are set to
become unplayable after two days, when “a
process similar to rusting makes them
unreadable.” When “rented” (or sold), the
discs are red — but two days’ exposure to
oxygen turns the discs black and makes it
impossible for a laser reader to read data off
the discs.††
There are now audio CDs that are copy-
protected and cannot be played on a comput-
er (or can be played only through play-back
software, not “ripping” software). Music files
contained on these CDs will not play if they
are distributed over the Internet or emailed.
Although CD copy-protection technology is
proprietary, researchers have been able to
determine that it works by deliberately creat-
ing errors so as to cripple the CD’s ability to
be copied — or, sometimes, by placing
“dummy” files on the CD that are so large
that CD recorders cannot burn them. In
some cases, use of copy-protected CDs has
prevented radio stations from playing the
songs — because the station used only PCs.≠
The digital content is being successfully pro-
tected, but at the cost of limiting broadcast
exposure normally used to spur sales. 
Trusted Computing. The Trusted
Computing Platform Alliance, or TCPA, has
been formed by Compaq, HP, IBM, Intel and
Microsoft, and more than 190 other compa-
nies have joined up. TCPA has defined what
it calls a “general purpose Trusted Subsystem”
intended for use in PCs. Using this system,
computers can remain open platform devices
that contain within them secure kernels for
content protection. The plan is for this to
happen through built-in security features
incorporated in both hardware and software.
On the software side, Microsoft is working on
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† On December 22, 2003, an Oslo appeals court affirmed a
lower court decision that had found that Jon Johansen, the per-
son who had hacked DVDs for Linux, not guilty of piracy.
Alister Doyle, “Norwegian Freed in DVD Film Piracy Case,”
Reuters, December 22, 2003.
†† See, Reuters, “Disney to slip DVDs a Mickey,” May 16, 2003,
available at <http://news.com.com/2100-1026-1003889.html>.
≠ In April 2003, EMI sent a radio station a bag of free discs
that the station was unable to play.  The station in question
had no standalone CD players because it used only desktop
PCs. “Copy Protected CDs: Artists Can Be the Losers,” The Age,
April 3, 2003, available at <http://www.theage.com.au/
articles/-2003/04/03/1048962867084.html.>.
a secure operating system. More generally,
part of the idea of “trusted computing” is for
the content itself to signal how it is to be pro-
tected, using Extensible Rights Markup
Language (XrML) — a set of statements
about the digital rights of the user and the
conditions under which such a license is
granted.† Licenses can be written in XrML
(thus stating the policy of the rights-holder)
and adhered to by DRM software (thus imple-
menting the rights-holder’s policy desires).
The policy questions surrounding XrML are
complex: Who decides what rights should be
expressed in this language and what these
rights mean? How do “fair use” and “first
sale” interoperate with devices that imple-
ment XrML commands? 
There has been very little public involve-
ment with TCPA or XrML processes. Nor has
there been public participation in the DVD
or CD licensing/lock-down discussion. These
are, in general, private solutions to the copy
protection concerns of the content industry
to which “notice and comment” rules of regu-
latory agencies do not apply.
D. ANALYSIS
Each of these proposed solutions (legisla-
tive, regulatory, and contractual) has power-
ful proponents who argue that increased con-
trol over copyrighted goods will stimulate cre-
ative activity by providing greater incentives
for creators and rights-holders. On the other
hand, there are strong arguments that wide-
ranging technical mandates will dampen
innovation, damage the high-tech industries,
and fundamentally alter the traditional bal-
ance between rights-holders and users with
negative impacts on the public domain. The
following section addresses the various 
proposals.
1. Dampening Innovation
a. Raising the Costs for the Second
Innovator
Debates about all of the pro-protection
legislative and regulatory efforts described
above have focused on the claim that greater
control by, and greater incentives for, creators
and distributors are justified because of the
unique threat posed by digital technologies.
But the policies proposed would also affect
the key role of follow-on innovators. All of
these legislative and regulatory efforts (as well
as private DRM solutions, to the extent they
are mandated by government) would raise
the costs of creation by the follow-on innova-
tor. As a result, these proposals are likely to
lead to an underproduction of innovation
from those who would otherwise base their
work on earlier created work. Moreover,
because the purpose of these proposals is to
provide for greater control by the original
rights-holders, whatever innovation is allowed
to occur will happen under the control of
those who came before. These original rights-
holders want to create an “orderly market-
place” in which innovation happens “accord-
ing to the rules.” To the extent that such con-
trol channels innovation to areas that do not
threaten incumbents or undercut existing
business models, the likelihood of genuine
breakthroughs will be sharply reduced.
One form of innovation that has drawn
the attention of economists is likely to be par-
ticularly affected. User-led innovation results
from changes made to products by customers
themselves — who know better than any sup-
plier what their needs are. Leading edge cus-
tomers, now bound by technologically fixed
licensing agreements, would be unable to
make changes to create new products or to
devise new uses. In a recent example of user-
led innovation, a purchaser-licensee of SONY
Corporation’s AIBO robot dog, obtained, in
violation of the license, the source code,
which allowed the dog to perform a limited
number of dances. The purchaser-licensee, a
programmer and AIBO enthusiast, then pro-
grammed the dog to do more dances and
made the program available to other AIBO
hobbyists. SONY objected until its customers
made clear that a programmable, more
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† XrML is based on work by the OASIS Rights Language
Technical Committee in defining a Rights Markup Language;
See www.xrml.org.
“open source” dog that could do more
dances was more valuable to them than a
“proprietary” dog with a more limited reper-
toire.
Limits on research. The effects of these pro-
protection proposals, as well as the effects of
existing laws intended to protect digital con-
tent, are quite direct in limiting research. For
example, the DMCA’s strictures regarding
anti-circumvention measures have been read
to discourage reverse-engineering — a tech-
nique that has traditionally been used in the
high-tech area, perhaps most intensely in the
videogame industry, to facilitate the develop-
ment of new products and services.†
Ironically, the DMCA may also be inhibiting
research about ways of making information
more secure. While the DMCA includes an
exemption for certain research regarding
encryption, at least one noted researcher in
the area was reminded by the Record
Industry Association of American that he
might be sued under the DMCA for disclo-
sure at an academic meeting of encryption
researchers of his findings that the methods
proposed by the RIAA for securing music
were, in fact, insecure.††
Anticompetitive impacts on the development of
new products and services. The potential reach
of the DMCA is beginning to emerge in court
cases. Some of the uses to which the Act is
being put may impede research and develop-
ment efforts related to product development
in areas far afield from digital copyright pro-
tection. Indeed, several commentators have
suggested that the DMCA may be used for
anti-competitive purposes. For example, in
the recent Lexmark v. Static Controls case,
Lexmark, one of the top U.S. manufacturers
of computer printers, tried to stop other com-
panies from supplying cartridges for its print-
ers by installing tiny computer chips in each
printer. Those chips cause the printers to
malfunction if the replacement cartridge
comes from anyone other than the original
manufacturer. In response, Static Control
designed a chip that enabled replacement
cartridges to work in the Lexmark printers.
That resulted in a lawsuit, in which Lexmark
successfully alleged that Static Control’s
microchip “spoofed” its copyrighted software
in violation of the DMCA.≠ Another recent
DMCA assertion was that a universal garage
door opener was a circumvention tool.* In
November 2003, an Illinois federal judge
ruled that the DMCA did not apply to garage
door openers to which no notice saying,
“interoperability is not allowed” had been
attached. The judge’s reliance on the plain-
tiff’s lack of notice to consumers left the core
DMCA issue of the legality of interoperability
unresolved. §
b. Reducing Incentives to Innovate
The broadcast flag and Cable/CE agree-
ments have in common their focus on
enshrining a particular group of proprietary
technologies (the 5C suite of technologies) as
copy protection technology in all consumer
electronics devices capable of storing, pro-
cessing, transmitting, and displaying digital
broadcast or cable content.‡ (The Hollings
bill made a suggestion that an effort be made
to find an appropriate copy protection that
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† See, Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer, “The Law
and Economics of Reverse Engineering,” 111 Yale L.J. 1575
(2002).
†† See, Letter RIAA to Professor Edward Felten, April 9, 2001,
available at <http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/Felten_v_RIAA/
20010409_riaa_sdmi_letter.html>.
≠ During a recent Copyright Office hearing concerning addi-
tions to DMCA exemptions, Former Register Ralph Oman, rep-
resenting Lexmark, at one point appeared to assert that users
need permission to run a computer program, and consequent-
ly that if users use a computer program for a purpose of which
its author disapproves, they are infringers. Email from Seth
Schoen of EFF, May 9, 2003. 
* Chamberlain v. Skylink, Civ. No. 02 C 6376 (N.D. III).
§ See, Memorandum Opinion and Order, November 13, 2003.
‡ The joint proposal of the Digital Transmission Licensing
Administrator, LLC (DTLA) and the Motion Picture
Association of America, et al. (MPAA) in the FCC’s Broadcast
Flag proceeding is known as the MPAA/5C proposal. The “5C”
consortium is made up of Hitachi Ltd., Intel Corporation,
Matushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd., Sony Corporation, and
Toshiba Corporation. 5C has developed the Digital Trans-
mission Content Protection System, or DTCP. DTLA is the
licensing authority joint venture founded by the 5C companies, 
would shield all digital content.) The
approval of any particular copy protection
technology by the government may dampen
innovation and competition in this market-
place. While the present proposals envision
subsequent development of additional copy
protection technologies that could be
approved by the FCC, any government
approval of a first standard will reduce the
economic incentives for those who might pro-
duce follow-on or alternative technologies
that would have to compete with an approved
and established standard. 
Even the private choice of particular tech-
nical protection schemes — such as the 
present DVD encryption technology, which
has already been hacked — is likely to inhibit
the development of stronger or different
copy protection technology. The enforcement
of these schemes through non-negotiable
license arrangements that prohibit unautho-
rized interoperability only heightens this con-
cern. If DVD-player manufacturers knowingly
employ less robust (or already-hacked) tech-
nology and rely on the law to protect them,
there is clearly less incentive for others to
develop and bring to the DVD licensing
regime stronger protection technologies. A
widely-adopted or governmentally mandated
standard may diminish incentives to create
“better” protection. This would surely be a
perverse effect. It seems better to stimulate
competition to produce better protection
than to enshrine a particular technology by
governmental mandate or industry fiat. 
If law rather than technology is relied
upon, the results may be unexpected. The
DVD encoding scheme has been cracked and
the results have been posted online. But in
order to prevent further dissemination of this
hack, courts have essentially established a
prior restraint on publication: preventing
websites from linking to other websites that
provide the means to decrypt DVDs. Such
restraints are normally thought of as allow-
able only in circumstances akin to publishing
the departure times of troop ships during
wartime, but here were authorized to protect
a technical protection mechanism that had
already been compromised.
c. Allowing Industry Gatekeepers to
Control Innovation
Some of the present proposals place
rights-holders in a position to impose stan-
dards on a broad range of devices. It is
important to examine who chooses
“approved” devices and content protection
technologies because of the effect this role
has on incentives to innovate. For example,
we understand that proponents of the broad-
cast flag proposal have said that they want to
have it affect the fewest possible devices. But
the current flag proposal explicitly establishes
the studios as approval-granters over future
product design for all devices that touch digi-
tal video content.† Such a “gatekeeper” role
potentially puts the rights holders in a posi-
tion to approve new technologies. The pro-
posed flag regulation raises concerns about
whether self-interested industry gatekeepers
will be in a position to approve uses of new
products that have previously been accepted
as reasonable (such as recording a program
on standard fixed media) or new innovations
(such as securely sharing a program on a
WiFi network). Imagine if those who sought
to bring the videocassette recorder to the
consumer marketplace in earlier days needed
the approval of the broadcast or movie 
industries. 
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which administers the licensing of DTCP. The characterization
of 5C as a suite, rather than just a set of intercompatible tech-
nologies, is bolstered by the terms of the DTCP license, which
largely restrict digital output to “approved” technologies. The
Cable/CE MOU now under consideration by FCC involves ask-
ing the FCC to endorse the 5C suite of technologies for protec-
tion of cable content. See, In the Matter of Implementation of
Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Commercial
Availability of Navigation Devices, Compatibility Between Cable
Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment, Federal
Communications Commission Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, FCC 03-3 (Jan. 10, 2003).
† Additionally, if the flag rules are put into effect, all 45 million
DVD players currently in consumers’ hands will become obso-
lete — because they will not be “compliant,” they will not be
permitted to manipulate DTV content that has been recorded
on a “compliant” DVD recorder. Edward W. Felten, Professor
of Computer Science, Princeton University, Testimony before
the Senate Commerce Committee (September 17, 2003).
d. Providing the Right Incentives
In supporting the broadcast flag proposal,
rights-holders have argued that in order to
protect their intellectual property rights they
need a governmental mandate requiring all
devices that touch digital broadcast content
to be sufficiently “robust” (secure and non-
tamperable) and “compliant” (possessed of
approved technology to prevent unautho-
rized flows of content through digital out-
puts). But the effect of this proposal is to
reduce the incentive of the rights-holders to
protect their own content.
Most analysts would say that the most
effective way to protect content is to protect it
as close as possible to the point of origina-
tion, rather than broadcasting it “in the clear”
and imposing standards on machines that
receive the content.† Thus, film studios could
encrypt their movies at the source and they
would then be broadcast in encrypted form.
For political reasons, this idea has not taken
root.†† Opponents of “encryption at the
source” have said that this technique would
instantly make obsolete existing digital televi-
sion receivers — because they would not have
the decryption boxes necessary to allow the
broadcast content to be viewed. But oppo-
nents of the flag proposal argue that (1) not
very many DTV receivers are now in the
hands of consumers; (2) a $25 device could
perform the necessary decryption; (3) early
adopters of DTV would likely be willing to
pay the extra $25; or (4) the content industry
could pay for these devices in order to pro-
tect its valuable content. Recent suggestions
that copyright protection is better obtained
through the forensic use of watermarks (thus
moving the complexity of protecting the con-
tent inside the content itself by stamping con-
tent with a mark and then looking for it out
on the Internet, rather than forcing this com-
plexity on hardware), lead in the same direc-
tion.
e. The Weaknesses of DRM
All of the proposals under discussion
involve an increased use of digital rights man-
agement technology, whether mandated by
government, approved by government, or as
part of private contractual arrangements. And
any system that seeks to monitor use of digital
information so as to reward rights-holders will
need some form of DRM. The Digital
Connections Council supports a rich, compet-
itive marketplace in DRM options that pro-
vides reasonable choices to consumers as well
as protection for copyrighted works. But it is
important to realize the limitations of DRM.
Simply put, DRM systems are likely to fail.
Technologists almost uniformly view them as
potentially valuable in the short term, as
“speed bumps” that slow down attempts to
obtain unauthorized access to digital informa-
tion, but vulnerable in the long term. The
average person might be unable to mount
even a rudimentary attack, and even talented
“crackers” might fail. But just one successful
attack can be incorporated into software that
will permit even an amateur to succeed.
Even if their fundamental weakness runs
deep, there are a large number of problems
with DRM that are closer to the surface.
Implementation of DRM systems inherently
increases systems cost. Due to the complexity
and heterogeneity of the devices in which
DRM-protected content must operate, DRM
systems often fail. For example, recent
attempts to introduce DRM-protected CDs
were marked by incidents in which the CDs
were unable to play on computer-based CD
drives or caused the computers into which
they were introduced to freeze. 
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† Indeed, there is substantial evidence that most films make
their way online not through consumer copying but through
leaks from inside the studios themselves — the so-called “stu-
dio hole.” See, Simon Byers, Lorrie Cranor et al., “Analysis of
Security Vulnerabilities in the Movie Production and
Distribution Process (2003),” available at <www.tprc.org.> This
report also showed that no Sony Classics films were available
online, and posited that because these classics are already avail-
able in DVD format, they are not “leaked” online. 
†† See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, “Congress Questions FCC
Copyright Plan,” (March 6, 2003) (reporting on House hear-
ing), available at <http://news.com.com/2100-1028-
991482.html.>
DRM systems can also convey a message to
consumers that companies are trying to pro-
tect themselves against their customers, and
thus that the interests of the consumer and
the company are adverse. Equally damaging
can be the lack of a message — a lack of
notice that what the consumer is purchasing
cannot be used on the same devices as appar-
ently identical media that the consumer pre-
viously purchased.†
There is another policy issue raised by
DRM systems. There is a substantial risk that
any information-gathering accomplished by
the DRM software will create data privacy lia-
bility for providers under the Data Protection
Directive of the European Union or other
similar laws. 
Compared with the regular version of any
device, the DRM version will have many new
ways of failing. This means that equipment
companies will have to staff helpdesks and
fund higher support costs. Also, compared to
the regular version, the DRM version will
have more versions, more customization fea-
tures, and more internationalization issues,
and will, therefore, be more expensive to
keep in inventory. All of these costs will have
to be carried by equipment manufacturers.
For content companies competing with
each other on the nature of the rights pack-
ages they grant, it is inevitable that customers
will begin to comparison-shop for rights. This
will put price pressures on these rights grants
and will drive their value down. This cannot
be a good business model for content compa-
nies.††
Yet even with these difficulties, some forms
of DRM are likely to be part of the solution to
today’s controversy. Clearly there is a need to
make rights-holders confident enough about
being rewarded that they will make their
works available to the public. And even
though DRM systems may be cracked, they
will serve as speed bumps; most consumers
will accept DRM limitations and not use avail-
able work-arounds, particularly if they feel
that they are getting adequate value for their
money — as can be seen from the widespread
consumer use of DVDs whose protection
scheme was cracked several years ago. But as
in other markets, it would be preferable to
have competition rather than fiat in the DRM
market and assured appropriate consumer
access to protected content.
Consumers will benefit most from simple
DRM that they understand well. Making con-
sumers spend a lot of time thinking about
whether they want to spend a dime on this
song now or later or never will create a good
deal of social cost, and requiring complex
DRM systems may reduce their commercial
potential. It is critical to acceptance of DRM
systems that they be simple, convenient, easy
to use, and easily understood by consumers. 
2. Impact on High-Tech Industries
A key metric against which all of the cur-
rent proposals should be measured is their
impact on U.S. high-tech businesses. The
extent to which these proposals:
• shift costs to the high-tech industry;
• negatively affect a sector that has been
responsible for substantial productivity
gains;
• put government in the position of mak-
ing decisions about product design;
• limit open platforms (such as the 
general purpose computer) and open
source product development;
• and generally dampen the economic
activity generated by the purchase of
equipment to record, store, manipu-
late, and transmit digital content needs
to be examined.
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† See Section VI(A), describing legislative attempts to address
this problem.
†† Dr. Bob Blakley of IBM analyzed the weaknesses of DRM at
a recent DRM conference at Berkeley, and many of the ideas in
this section were drawn from that presentation.  The Law and
Technology of DRM Conference, Berkeley, California,
(February 27 - March 1, 2003), available at
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/
drm/index2.html>.
a. Shifting Costs
The proposed use of governmental man-
dates dramatically shifts the cost of protection
onto the consumer electronics, information
technology, and Internet access industries.† If
content providers encrypt, they have to pay
for encryption; if the broadcast flag or
Cable/CE agreement mandate encryption
through the regulation of hardware and soft-
ware, the content industry will get whatever
protection this provides for free. The reality
is that most home devices are not used for
piracy. Any regulation mandating copy pro-
tection technology will require that all home
devices and all enterprise computers (some
85 percent of U.S. computers are manufac-
tured for use by enterprises, not consumers)
recognize “flagged” material and treat it
appropriately. This means that all of these
millions of devices will have to be redesigned
for this special purpose, and these costs will
be born by the manufacturers of these
devices and, ultimately, by consumers. It
would be preferable for those who have the
greatest incentive to protect their content to
have the task of doing so.††
This cost-shifting effort is not without
precedent. Rights-holders’ historic reaction to
piracy has been to seek levies on recording
devices and media, arguing that manufactur-
ers profit from products that are used for
these purposes. This effort makes some sense
when applied to single-purpose devices that
have been built only to copy the studios’ con-
tent. But it makes less sense when applied to
flexible, open-platform, multifunction devices
such as personal computers.
There is another form of cost shifting that
occurs: the costs borne by consumers when
hundreds of millions of devices that do not
conform to standards for technical protection
(mandated directly by the government, or rat-
ified by the government) are rendered obso-
lete. If the analog hole was ever successfully
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† See, Raymond James Report at 36.
†† See, e.g., John Markoff, “Plan Would Use Software, Not
Devices, to Fight Piracy,” New York Times, April 15, 2003. 
Another approach whose proponents argue that it might
more appropriately balance benefits and burdens between
rights-holders and others in the digital copyright context
would be to establish a compulsory license to be paid by ISPs
on behalf of their users in connection with access to and trans-
mission of any copyrighted work. In a variation of this propos-
al, Fred von Lohmann of EFF proposed a compulsory license
fee to be paid via a surcharge on Internet access with a portion
of the money paid to the record labels and a portion paid
directly to artists based on popularity on file-sharing networks.
<http://dailyprincetonian.com/archives/ 2003/04/14/
opinion/7930.shtml> (In general, compulsory licensing occurs
when third parties are allowed access to copyrighted works
without the consent of the owner and on payment of a fee.) In
other contexts, high transaction costs for licensing individual
works have led to the imposition, by statute and regulation, of
compulsory licenses. For example, in the 1970s, the cable
industry was able to get a compulsory license for “over the air”
signals (17 U.S.C. 111). In the 1980s, the license was extended
to the nascent satellite industry (17 U.S.C. 119). Some have
argued that in the digital copyright world the difficulties of
determining who should pay such royalties, who should collect
them, and how they should be allocated once received are
insuperable. So far, no legislation has been introduced to
extend compulsory licensing to interactive services.
The music industry has said it plans to
recoup revenue lost to free P2P services from
other industries that have benefited from
these file-sharing services. The Canadian
Private Copyright Protective (the Canadian
equivalent of the RIAA) has proposed a $21
per gigabyte fee for hard disk drives that
would compensate copyright-holders for file-
sharing losses.(a) The group has also asked
the Copyright Board of Canada to significant-
ly increase fees on recordable DVDs and CDs.
The music industry may try to collect pay-
ments from Australian broadband Internet
providers, believing that demand for faster
music downloading speeds may be driving
demand for high-speed Internet service. The
chief of the RIAA said in a speech to a music
conference in Cannes that she planned to
“hold Internet services providers more
accountable” for Internet file-sharing.(b) Peter
Coroneos, Executive Director of the
Australian Internet Industry Association, said
that ISPs are well protected by copyright law,
and would fight any attempt by the music
industry to shift costs to their sector.
a. Raymond James Report, n. 19, at 33. Ian Austen, 
New York Times, May 16, 2002.
b. Sue Lowe, “Music Industry Chases Internet Providers
for Lost Revenue,” Sidney Morning Herald, January 22,
2003. http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/01/21/
1042911380707.html.
COST-SHIFTING
closed, all existing analog devices that were
capable of displaying or storing digital con-
tent would become incapable of optimal per-
formance in the processing and display of
digital information, even if they were capable
of being partially upgraded via hardware or
software.† Given the roughly 270 million tele-
visions in 100 million U.S. households and
the 92 million households with VCRs, this is
no small effect with no small cost.39
Earlier copy protection schemes failed
when consumers were willing to pay more for
devices that were more flexible and capable
— and that provided them with more of the
bundle of intellectual property rights than
those devices that were locked down. Unless
the market for devices is perfectly regulable,
devices that provide more rather than less
capability will prove more attractive to con-
sumers and will command higher prices in
the marketplace. “Illegal” devices, whether
hardware or software, are manufactured in
other countries, and may well flood the U.S.
market. At the same time, the U.S. govern-
ment will be saying that it has the power to
eliminate choices of devices. Devices that pro-
vide greater constraints on consumer behav-
ior will be less attractive and will fail, unless
government mandates eliminate other com-
petitive choices for consumers. 
b. The Special Case of the General
Purpose Computer
Designed in a garage by hobbyists, the per-
sonal computer is an icon of American inno-
vation. It is increasingly difficult to distin-
guish between “computers” and all other
devices, as consumer electronic products are
built with memory and processing power, and
microprocessors make walls and tables loca-
tion-aware. Given the sweeping nature of the
technical protection mandates that have been
proposed, as processing power, memory, and
transmission capabilities become part of
more and more devices, all of these machines
may be swept into a world of copyright regu-
lation.
Part of the reason for the success of digital
computing has been the freedom to develop
new products and services that take advan-
tage of the extraordinary progress made in
processing, storage, and transmission of digi-
tal information. One can see the startling
results of such freedom in the growth of the
Internet. Anyone can design and implement
a new product or service at the edge of the
Internet without seeking the approval of a
central authority. Moreover, the design princi-
ple now enshrined at the center of the
Internet is that Internet standards should not
be optimized for any particular application,
in order to prevent today’s design constraints
from preventing the emergence of tomor-
row’s “next big idea.” Yet the current propos-
als for mandating particular technological
protection mechanisms involve setting con-
straints on the design of all digital devices.
Titanic legal battles have been fought to pre-
vent the exercise of private control over inno-
vation in the personal computer software
market through a monopoly over the operat-
ing system market; mandating particular
design constraints to protect digital content
seems to be moving in the opposite direction.
Moreover, compliance with the broadcast
flag (as currently proposed) would require
the general-purpose computer — still an
open-platform device — to become “secure”
and “untamperable.” Would this mean that
future generations of garage tinkerers would
be unable to open their devices, poke, push,
or prod in order to bring us the steady stream
of innovation we have come to expect?
c. Ignoring the Role of Open Source
These same broadcast flag requirements of
being secure and untamperable create special
problems for the developing area of open
source software. Such a legal requirement is
antithetical to open source software, which by
its very nature, is intended to be tampered
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† Additionally, even if only a few analog-digital-analog convert-
ers remain available (such as those that are imported from
other countries), even a fully protected digital bitstream can be
converted at very low cost to a high-quality analog version —
and then re-digitized.
with. Indeed, tampering is how open source
software products (including security software
products) are improved. 
The role of open source software is being
systematically ignored in many of the propos-
als under discussion in this report, and partic-
ularly in the broadcast flag context. Open
source software is increasingly important as a
source of innovation; it can be far more reli-
able and secure than proprietary software
because talented programmers around the
world can examine the code and try to break
its security, without having to worry about
hidden backdoors or holes. Yet such examina-
tion and the resulting improvement appears
incompatible with a prohibition on tamper-
ing. 
Digital television signals can now be
demodulated in software, allowing general-
purpose computers to function as digital tele-
visions; software products with this capability
will be widely available in a few years. It is 
difficult to imagine the FCC successfully regu-
lating software products. When open source
software products are capable of allowing
viewers to see digital video on their home
personal computers, neither the FCC nor the
studios will know what “manufacturer” to sue
if applicable regulations are ignored by these
products. 
d. Riskiness of Government Mandates
As has been noted, there are substantial
problems with widespread DRM usage, even
that which results from private agreement.
But government technology mandates raise
even more issues for the future of this coun-
try’s high-tech industries. Traditionally, the
U.S. has relied on a relatively restrictive role
for government, with market failures provid-
ing a justification for limited government
action. Government technology mandates
have been particularly suspect in the fast mov-
ing world of high technology both because of
the pace of government — a slower pace in
legislating or imposing regulations may be
desirable to obtain broad agreement about
public law but is highly undesirable in mak-
ing high-tech product decisions. The high-
tech industry has also criticized the govern-
ment’s lack of technical expertise, and the
fact that the essence of many government
decisions is political (even in the best sense of
the word). Having innovation overseen by a
particular self-interested industry, or a slow-
moving government agency, or by officials
attuned to the political impact of a decision,
is not the way the high-tech industries are
accustomed to operate — nor should it be.
Any broad government involvement in DRM
mandates raises a substantial risk of back-
ward-looking regulation, freezing in existing
ways of doing business. This kind of regula-
tion will inevitably favor incumbents, and
threatens to allow the past to control the
future. Government agencies should not be
in the position of making business decisions
in dynamic high-tech markets or mandating
the use of particular technologies. 
e. Frustrating Consumer Expectations
The flag regime (and any mandated DRM
scheme) will frustrate existing consumer
expectations — and if consumers are con-
fused they will buy fewer IT industry prod-
ucts. Consumers expect to be able to time-
shift, fast-forward, store, copy, and use digital
content in portable, mobile devices. Although
consumers have (so far) been content with
encrypted DVDs, as they become more
sophisticated and as convergence between
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“Another important plank in this agree-
ment [between the RIAA, the Business
Software Alliance, and the Computer
Systems Policy Project] is a firm commit-
ment to opposing government-imposed
technological mandates. The RIAA
believes in innovation. And we believe
that consumers in the marketplace, not
the government, should decide which
technological innovations will thrive.” 
Hillary Rosen, Business 2.0.(a)
a. http://www.business2.com/articles/mag/
0,1640,48572,00.html.
electronic devices continues, they may be
frustrated when they are not able to easily
move content from one favorite device to
another. Reasonable consumer expectations
also include the expectation that existing
devices will continue to interoperate with new
devices.†
A July 2002 GartnerG2 survey reported
that 77 percent of respondents thought they
should be able to copy CDs for personal use
in another device; 60 percent said they
should be able to give copies of CDs to mem-
bers of their families; and 82 percent thought
that they should be able to copy CDs for per-
sonal backup purposes. These results do not
square with the move towards copy-protection
of CDs. Copy-protected CDs limit users’
options — preventing them from making a
copy of the CD to play in their car, for exam-
ple, as one could with a cassette tape. But
they also limit the ability of consumers to use
the same CD in different places or on differ-
ent machines. In some cases, the protected
CDs cannot even be played in more than one
of the consumer’s CD players.†† Consumers
who are used to being able to copy CDs or
use them on any of their playback devices are
frustrated by these new restrictions, and there
has been a move to require that copy-protect-
ed CDs be clearly labeled.≠
In the meantime, copy-protected CDs are
beginning to move into the U.S. commercial
market in large numbers for the first time.
Analysts have reported that Arista Records (a
subsidiary of BMG Music) will be shipping
protected CDs into the U.S. in May-June
2003.40
f. Overall Impact on the Information
Technology Industry
The potential shifting of costs of content
protection to the consumer electronics and
information technology industries poses a
challenge to one of the most dynamic sectors
of the U.S. economy. Not only would such
cost-shifting reduce the incentives of the con-
tent distribution industry to manage the tran-
sition to a digital world — and place the
incentives on a sector farther from the source
of the problem — but, by imposing design
constraints, it would also challenge the infor-
mation technology industry’s ability to inno-
vate. That innovation has resulted in enor-
mous investment in information technology
over the last decade (a critical factor in the
economic successes of the U.S. in the 1990s)
and contributed substantially to the upward
trend in productivity growth that emerged in
the U.S. in the late 1990s.41 And despite the
recent slump, computer and electronic prod-
uct manufacturers shipped $429.5 billion
worth of goods in 2001.42
These numbers dwarf the $69.4 billion
revenues of the movie and video industry
over the same period.43 Even the $93.2 
billion of consumer electronic products
shipped in 2001 seems large in comparison.44
While it is important to ensure the proper
functioning of the copyright system — and
the movie industry in particular deserves
attention due to its strong growth rate and
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≠ See, discussion of Boucher-Doolittle bill above.
† Under the flag regime, this simply will not be the case.
Existing (“legacy”) storage devices will not be permitted to store
flagged content. Legacy players will not be permitted to play
flagged content. Content stored upstairs will not be playable
downstairs — unless a “compliant” device is already in place
downstairs. If the flag regime is put in place, consumers will
have to get all new devices for their home networks — and busi-
ness users will have to decide how to cope with these severe
interoperability problems. See generally, In the Matter of Digital
Broadcast Content Protection, MB-02-230, Before the Federal
Communications Commission, Reply Comments of Public
Knowledge and Consumers Union (filed February, 18, 2003).
†† In a related development, after Intuit recently released a ver-
sion of TurboTax that included a key “tying” the software to a
particular machine (and thus preventing its use on multiple
home machines), uproar caused it to backtrack and provide an
uninstaller program to users. <http://www.pcmag.com/arti-
cle2/ 0,4149,821308,00.asp.> Intuit was using a program called
C-Dilla (also known as Safecast) from Macrovision for activa-
tion. C-Dilla writes a code, based on the registration number
and activation information, to a user’s hard disk (in an area
that is not copied by hard disk backup and restore software
such as Casper, or erased by normal (DOS level) reformatting
of the hard drive). Users could not get a second activation code
for another computer. Similarly, Microsoft’s Office XP reverts to
“Reduced Functionality Mode” if it is not activated within 50
launches, and activation of a copy of XP ties that copy to the
particular device requesting activation. See, “Microsoft FAQs
regarding product activation,” available at <http://
www.microsoft.com/piracy/basics/activation/mpafaqasp.>
positive trade balance — it is fair to ask
whether shifting costs to the IT industry is
analogous to the tail wagging the dog.
Attempts to lock down information and
force the production of lower capability
devices — in the face of technology trends
that continue to improve the ability of these
devices to record, store, manipulate, and
transmit digital information — also ignores
the significant economic activity entailed by
consumers participation in digital content.
Much consumer activity in this arena is, obvi-
ously, legal. Billions of dollars are spent annu-
ally by consumers for Internet access, and this
number is increasing daily as broadband pen-
etration continues to grow. And the growth in
the number of devices (particularly portable
devices) that allow users access to content has
been dramatic. Six million portable digital
media players were shipped in 2001, up 50
percent from the year 2000.45 The list of
media and devices that are designed for digi-
tized content continues to grow: satellite TV,
cable TV, digital broadcast TV, video cam-
corders, digital still cameras, personal video
recorders such as TIVO, CDs, DVDs and their
respective players, CD and DVD burners etc.
— many of these devices are recent additions
to this list.46
3. Impact on the Public Domain
Many of the digital rights proposals under
consideration threaten to change the tradi-
tional balance struck between the incentives
provided to creators by allowing them to con-
trol the exploitation of their work and the
rights of users to have some form of access to
the work and some right to make use of it.
That balance, developed over hundreds of
years, has produced widespread voluntary
adherence and seemed to fit comfortably in a
world of tangible books, magazines, and
videocassettes — the world of atoms.
We now have a situation where technology
can trump existing legal rights: DRM schemes
(such as the proposed “broadcast flag” sys-
tem) theoretically allow control over access to
creative works notwithstanding what the law
says about fair use. If a copyright-owner could
establish perfect DRM, either through private
agreement (as in the cable and satellite con-
texts) or through governmental mandate (as
in the broadcast flag context), such an owner
could ignore these existing user-rights —
unless the law provided users of these safety
valves with some form of enforceable rights. 
Two problems stand out with respect to
accepting this technological approach to
legal rights. First, it may substantially narrow
the public domain — expansion of which is a
central tenet of the bargain underlying our
copyright laws. Second, it may undermine
societal respect for law and discourage self-
enforcement. 
a. Restricting Public Access to 
Digital Information
The absence of user control over private,
non-commercial uses of lawfully obtained
content has substantial implications. Secure
systems that do not allow reasonable uses to
be made of protected digital information
(unless a license fee has been paid) surely
impede the user’s ability to make productive
uses of the locked-up materials that could
themselves “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.” 
For example, a key (and common) trans-
formative/productive use of content is “sam-
pling” — fragmentary “theft” used in a way
that does not create a loss to the owner.
Appropriation has been an integral part of
the creative process since there was a creative
process, and the digital era is rich with exam-
ples of new works created through sampling.
Users can access millions of sounds, riffs,
loops, and sonic textures online and use
them to create their own works. Existing
DRM systems do not permit sampling of the
works they lock down. 
According to the American Library
Association, the DMCA’s prohibition of cir-
cumvention “places criminal penalties on top
of contractual restrictions, thereby increasing
publishers’ ability to control access to
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works.”47 The libraries are concerned that
technical measures currently in use “blur con-
trol over initial access with control over
library lending and fair use practices such as
viewing, reading, extracting, copying, and
printing.”48 Moreover, a DRM system’s tech-
nology may not recognize when the works it
protects are no longer subject to copyright
protection and therefore have fallen into the
public domain. Such potentially unlimited
control is also contrary to the philosophy
behind the first sale doctrine, which calls for
extinguishing control over “copies” once they
have been distributed.† Restrictive licensing of
digital works is becoming the standard, and
as print sources become increasingly obso-
lete, users are being forced to agree to what-
ever conditions are stated in private licenses
in order to get access to the information they
need.
The content distribution industry asserts
that only if they have sufficient control to
allow for certainty in their digital distribution
channel can they provide users with a wide
variety of choices and price points for
licensed use of their material. This is a power-
ful argument for allowing the market to func-
tion without artificial constraints or supports
and for suppliers and consumers to exercise
their rights to choose. The problem with the
content industry argument is that the ability
to offer many choices carries with it the abili-
ty to offer only one choice. In the end, users
are left with the content industry’s promise
that they will have choices — or with the
argument that in a world in which distribu-
tion is cheap and perfect price discrimination
is possible, everyone will be able to obtain
what they are willing to pay for. But if the
content industry chooses to offer only one
profit-maximizing option — say, pay-per-view
— for all of its cultural artifacts, and if the
law provides no alternative path for access
(even for the purposes for which fair use was
codified), users will find the sphere of pub-
licly available material shrinking rapidly.
The fundamental idea behind intellectual
property protection is that creators are enti-
tled to limited incentives in order to stimu-
late the production — and distribution — of
new works. We grant limited privileges to cre-
ators because we want them to create and to
share their works for the benefit of society as
a whole, not in order to give them total con-
trol over how their works are used. The cen-
tral problem with broad use of DRM is not
that software code will be regulating users,
but that content creators will be unilaterally
regulating private uses of content and con-
trolling the course of subsequent innovation.
b. Undermining Self-Enforcement
It is one thing for society to make some
action “wrong” or “illegal.” It is quite another
for society to enable private parties to make
an otherwise lawful action impossible.
Building digital walls may be antithetical to
building trust and that sense of community
that is essential to encouraging voluntary
compliance with law — particularly if those
walls do not reflect shared values. Building
such walls is the technological equivalent of
Prohibition — and will likely be as success-
ful.†† If our government tells us that we may
only use systems that obey the “authorization”
mandates of others, and those mandates
ignore shared values, many among us may
seek to breach the walls in order to act in
ways that we have been accustomed to doing,
and which the law has previously authorized.
If we substitute electronic fences for internal-
ized values, and technical controls for pub-
licly created law, we may lose our collective
moral bearings and the considerable benefits
of self-enforcement. Instead of enforcing a
social bargain designed to encourage both
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† “[A] bill to change the first sale doctrine . . . is not a modest
proposal. It is . . . a major substantive proposal involving a 
fundamental change in one of the main tenets of copyright
law.” Comment of Chairman Kastenmeier at the 1990 Senate
Judiciary hearings on the Computer Software Rental Amendments
Act of 1990, quoted by the ALA in their comments at p. 20.
†† Following Prohibition, consumers went back to legitimate
(non-bootleg) outlets for liquor because of a desire to ensure
good quality. Raymond James Report.
creation and the public access that stimulates
innovation and economic growth, overuse of
DRM (particularly government-mandated
DRM) may lead to a world where resort to
the courts to obtain legal enforcement of
rights becomes the norm and where, as
Chairman Greenspan described, “our court
system would be swamped into immobility
and the performance of our economy would
suffer.” As he observed, “if our market system
is to function smoothly, the vast majority of
trades must rest on mutual trust and only
indirectly on the law.” †
Currently, private DRM discussions and
agreements are occurring in a world that is
based on licensing rather than purchase. As a
DRM company executive said recently, “Any
content company can distribute digital con-
tent with any level of protection and any
assigned rights of use now, and should be
attempting just that rather than trying to
replicate existing business models.” The move
from purchase to license marks a significant
change in our relationship to goods. Very few
consumers read clickwrap agreements in
detail, and none of these agreements are
negotiable in any real sense.†† Unless the law
provides otherwise, private agreements can
ignore previously defined norms — indeed,
license agreements could establish outra-
geous norms without our being aware of it,
such as forbidding criticism or parody of the
content licensed, or allowing our machines to
be disabled remotely if the license terms were
disobeyed, or permitting detailed review and
reporting of private information about the
user as a condition of access to content.
Consumers obtaining access to digital works
are routinely required to agree to terms that
include waiver of long-standing limitations on
exclusive copyright rights, such as the first
sale doctrine and fair use. Routine library
practices that are permitted under copyright
law (such as interlibrary lending, lending for
classroom or at-home use, archiving and
preservation for historical purposes, and
duplication for fair use purposes) are fre-
quently restricted or barred by licensing
agreements. Some first sale/fair uses are con-
ditioned by license agreements on payment
of additional fees — a practice that will
inevitably increase the information-gap
between the rich and the poor. Because our
economy is increasingly based on intangible
assets, and we are continually growing more
dependent on access to digital goods con-
trolled via licensing agreements, we need to
be thoughtful as a society about what license
terms are permissible and how they affect the
values that underlie our copyright regimes
and our democracy.≠
Those who advocate the aggressive use of
DRM argue that there is no right to access
another’s property — no right, for example,
to break into a Border’s bookstore at 3 AM to
read a book there. But the work we license is
not locked in the bookstore; DRM operates,
as one observer has noted, more like a chain
locking a work we felt we “owned” to a partic-
ular table; the chain does not allow the work
to be shared with a friend, read in a more
comfortable armchair, or taken to a copy
machine in order to bring an excerpt to
class.§
The existence of private license agree-
ments containing “unreasonable” terms —
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† See, Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Market
Economies and Rule of Law,” at the 2003 Financial Markets
Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Sea Island,
Georgia (April 4, 2003).
†† Indeed at least one major computer company apparently
does not even package any form of license (hard or soft copy)
with the software to which these licenses apply.
<http://www.cypherpunks.ca/dell.html>, (August 28, 2003.)
≠ Recently, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bowers v. Baystate
Technologies, 01-1108, -1109 (finding that federal copyright law
does not preempt a shrink-wrapped contract barring reverse
engineering) has been the subject of great concern. Many pub-
lic-interest groups and law professors signed an amicus brief in
that case and have petitioned for certiorari, arguing that the
decision allows unacceptably broad restraints on reverse engi-
neering, fair use, and other limits on copyright, and suggesting
that copyright law should preempt contract.
§ Prof. Cohen has argued that the First Amendment supports a
“right to read anonymously,” which bars the government from
enacting measures supporting the technological protection
measures that infringe on such a right. Julie E. Cohen, “A
Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at ‘Copyright
Management’ in Cyberspace,” 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981 (1996).
terms inconsistent with shared values —
undermines the societal interest in self-
enforcing contracts. The self-enforcement
aspect of private agreements is essential; after
all, voluntary compliance with private agree-
ments is what makes a society livable. If we
create a world where license terms do not
appear to represent a fair bargain, and are
contrary to shared values, we are likely to
have built a world where there is little inclina-
tion for voluntary compliance and much
delight taken in rule-breaking. Such a world
will be filled with obtuse letters threatening
dire legal consequences, or (more likely)
widespread remote disabling of the machines
upon which we rely. Just as we respect laws
that embody our values, and self-enforce
(thus avoiding the need for policemen at
every corner), we respect private agreements
that are fair and embody good bargains. Self-
enforcement of private agreements is a socie-
tal benefit and a self-annealing process, and is
preferable to strict enforcement by outside
parties — or even by the party with technical
control over the machine of a consumer who
“agreed” to an unreasonable license.
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This report has reviewed three significant
trends — the movement from analog to digi-
tal information, from physical to intangible
goods, and from sale to licensing. We have
examined the development of the copyright
balance over the years in the face of techno-
logical change, and the challenges these
three trends are now posing to that balance:
how to provide appropriate incentives for cre-
ators when their works may be copied per-
fectly and distributed widely without signifi-
cant costs, while recognizing societal interests
in access to information. We have reviewed
proposals from the rights-holders to address
these challenges through legal, regulatory,
and contractual terms, all of which turn on
providing far greater control to rights-holders
than has been extended in the past. We have
found these proposals flawed in important
respects.
But the challenges faced by rights-holders
are real. A copyright system is not function-
ing if anyone can take a work, copy it perfect-
ly, and share it freely with two hundred mil-
lion people unknown to them without regard
for the wishes of the rights-holder.
We do not believe that the present propos-
als should be adopted. Nor do we believe
there is presently a perfect alternative solu-
tion. But we have also reached the view that
there are ways of proceeding, and ways not to
proceed, that will allow us to develop a robust
solution that will appropriately balance the
rights of creators (both the original and the
follow-on creator), continue the leading role
played by dynamic high tech industries,
honor political and social goals of widespread
access to information, and improve prospects
for continued innovation and economic
growth.
In attempting to develop a roadmap for
ways in which to proceed, we have kept in
mind certain principles that have guided
CED over the years. It is important to 
thoroughly analyze a problem and not to
rush to impose a solution without an under-
standing of its impacts. As with the practice of
medicine, one should take care first to “do no
harm.” Relying on market forces is a useful
starting point, but government has an impor-
tant role to play in addressing important
issues, particularly if market solutions are
unlikely to promote fundamental social val-
ues. Calls for government action are weakest
when the petitioner asks the government to
mandate or impose a particular technology
— solutions that are technologically neutral
and that utilize sound economic incentives
are more likely to work under rapidly chang-
ing technological conditions. Governmental
action is likelier to succeed if it reflects broad-
ly shared values that commend themselves to
voluntary compliance. And, finally, proposals
should be judged with respect to their impact
on continued innovation and, thus, sustained
economic growth — which creates the condi-
tions for continued social and cultural
progress.
With these principles in mind — chief
among them, the desire to promote innova-
tion and sustained economic growth — the
Digital Connections Council makes the fol-
lowing recommendations:
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VII. FINDING A BETTER PATH
1. Because quick legislative or regulatory
solutions for the problem of digital copy-
right protection pose risks to innovation
and economic growth, and are likely to
have unintended consequences in a period
of rapid technological change, we should
move slowly. Our first concern should be
to “do no harm.” We should dedicate the
next two years to attempting to build con-
sensus about the appropriate role in the
digital age for traditional legal safety
valves that balance the exclusive rights of
creators in copyright regimes with users’
rights. The Digital Connections Council
looks forward to facilitating this national
and international dialogue.
Proponents of legislative and regulatory
action now argue that we cannot afford to
wait, that we must act now, that the future of
their entire industries now hang in the bal-
ance, that “[p]rompt action is required to
save broadcast television” (or movies, or cable
television). It is clear that the financial results
of the music distribution industry have
declined over the last three years, but a close
look at that marketplace reveals a number of
significant factors in addition to file sharing
that may have contributed to this downturn.
Efforts now underway to experiment with dif-
ferent business models for music distribution
are gaining ground. And the continued
growth of other indicators, such as revenues
from musical performances, suggests the vital-
ity of the music industry as a whole.49 We
should not move quickly to change laws or
regulations, being mindful of the first rule to
“do no harm.”
While the movie industry fears
“Napsterization,” it is coming off its most suc-
cessful year in several decades. And the prin-
cipal difference between the music industry’s
experience and that of the movie industry is
the enormous bandwidth required to down-
load a digitized movie. While a 56 Kbps con-
nection — now the standard dial-up modem
rate — allows a 5MB MP3 audio file to be
downloaded in twelve minutes, downloading
a one-hour video file, even one with VCR
quality resolution, would require 20 hours
over a 56 Kbps connection, and a high-defini-
tion video file would take impossibly long to
download. It is true that the threat to the
movie industry will increase with the growth
of broadband connections in U.S. house-
holds: Home broadband access in the United
States climbed in 2002 by 59 percent over
2001, bringing the total number of U.S. users
who accessed the web via high-speed connec-
tions to more than 33.6 million in December
2002.50 But even with this growth bandwidth
constraints remain: a VCR-quality hour of
standard (analog) TV would require about
four hours to download over a broadband
connection, but an hour of high definition
digital television would take at least 18 hours
to download over a typical cable modem or
DSL connection. There is little evidence that
people are now sharing movie files online in
large numbers in the way audio files are
shared. Access to sufficient bandwidth in the
“last mile” to make downloading videos pain-
less is several years away. And, while lagging
behind the music industry, the movie industry
has also begun to experiment with new 
business models. At the same time, industry
efforts to educate consumers about appropri-
ate conduct and to bring enforcement
actions under current law should continue to
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RECOMMENDATIONS
have a positive impact on consumer
behavior.†
We should use this legislative and regulato-
ry moratorium to attempt to build a new con-
sensus about the basic “safety valves” that bal-
ance the exclusive rights of creators — fair
use, first sale, archiving and preservation in a
digital environment. This approach may seem
too slow for some rights-holders whose partic-
ipation in the dialogue is critical. But we
need to take our time as a society making up
our minds about what policy direction to
take. We have moved from a world in which
we can think about a physically manifested
work — like a book — to a world of swirling,
undifferentiated bits. When we buy a book,
we understand what it is we are doing and
what access rights we have to that book.
When we license software, on the other hand,
we know less about what this means, and the
two parties to the licensing agreement may
have wildly different expectations about their
respective rights, including rights to access or
duplicate the content. Because we are still
uncertain about this new world, we need to
think carefully about what we do and, in par-
ticular, the relation between newly developing
technological means of control and access
guarantees traditionally found in intellectual
property laws.
The key question that must be answered is
whether we, as a society, have achieved an
appropriate balance. Such a balance must
provide the right incentives to creators to cre-
ate. But it also must demonstrate a healthy
respect for the purposes that copyright has
sought to achieve by allowing a means for
access to copyrighted material — including
the ability of individuals to make appropriate
private noncommercial uses of copyrighted
material. Such access recognizes the innova-
tive impact of those who build on earlier
works of creation. For this reason, we should
be careful not to unnecessarily perpetuate
rules that were created for a world made up
of atoms that were physically distributed. 
2. The development and testing of new busi-
ness models for the distribution of cre-
ative content should be given the highest
priority by the content industries. We
should not turn to law or regulation to
protect any particular business model.
It is our belief that that the most impor-
tant efforts the content industry can make are
those directed toward the development and
testing of new business models for the distri-
bution of creative content. This is not to min-
imize the need for educational campaigns
about the rights and responsibilities of users,
and enforcement — particularly directed
toward large- scale physical duplication of
recorded media — and development of tech-
nical protection measures that can accommo-
date consumer expectations such as time-
shifting, space-shifting, non-commercial per-
sonal copies, and fair use.†† But it is to
emphasize that the perfect storm threatens
not creative activity but the current models
for its commercial distribution.
The best protection of commercial distri-
bution plans against the forces of digitization
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†† Educational campaigns are sorely needed. A recent Business
Software Alliance study found that nearly two-thirds of college
students surveyed said they would download pirated software.
“Only a third of those students who have already downloaded
commercial software have paid for it.” Stefanie Olson,
“Students Unfazed by Piracy,” News.com., (September 16,
2003), available at <http://news.com.com/2100-1027-
5077451.html>.
† While the recent RIAA suits against several hundred upload-
ers have created a public relations furor for the music industry,
these suits are appropriate under current law. The RIAA’s tac-
tics, however, have included use of a section of the DMCA that
permits subpoenas to be sent to ISPs for users’ personal infor-
mation without review by any judicial officer — and without
notice to users. Many have recommended that this section of
the DMCA, Section 512(h), be amended to require user notice
and judicial review. See, e.g., Alan B. Davidson, Associate
Director, Center for Democracy & Technology, Testimony
before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, (September 17, 2003.) The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has recently held
that such subpoenas are not permissible under Section 512(h)
of the DMCA. Recording Industry Association of American, Inc. v.
Verizon Internet Services, Inc., U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, 2003, U.S. App. LEXIS 25735. The RIAA has also been
criticized for not checking its facts before sending demand let-
ters; in the last wave of cases, the RIAA went after people who
had not in fact uploaded music and who were minors. See,
<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,96797,00.html> (12
year old girl); <http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2003-09-
24-riaa-drops-suit_x.htm> (66 year old woman who had never
downloaded song-sharing software).
— perfect copies, freely distributed — are
business plans that recognize these character-
istics (what some have called the “natural
laws” of the digital economy) and employ
them to better serve customer needs.
Business plans that benefit from freely avail-
able copying and distribution are those most
attractive in the emerging economy where
“viral marketing” is an accepted norm.
Early efforts directed at enforcement or
galvanizing legal or regulatory assistance to
shut down file sharing systems or extend fed-
erally approved digital rights management
systems into every possible digital display
device seemed to distract the content indus-
try from the development of new business
models.51 It is not surprising that there would
be a reluctance to engage in these experi-
ments because of the risk of undercutting
business models already in place. 
But the affected industries are now
increasingly engaged in various experiments
for digital delivery of their products. As
Michael Eisner, CEO of Disney, a strong pro-
ponent of technical mandates, recently told
the National Association of Broadcasters
annual convention, Disney will utilize the
fullest range of digital technologies, while
recognizing the threats they pose — and will
even rethink its current business models. In
the future, Eisner said, movie studios will
need to be more flexible about the way they
distribute movies. In place of the current
sequence of studio releases (from theaters to
video to pay-per-view to television), studios
will need to offer faster distribution, directly
to consumers. As he put it, “If we don’t pro-
vide consumers with our product in a timely
manner, pirates will.” 52
According to the head of the Recording
Industry Association of America, some of the
new models are gaining traction. It is clear
that the new models have begun to accommo-
date customer expectations, moving in the
direction of lower prices, wider choice of
music, the ability to make copies of music
that is downloaded, and even to burn down-
loaded music into a physical medium. Apple’s
iTunes Music Store, providing music down-
loads from a large library of songs, processed
as many downloads on its opening day in May
2003 as had been collectively requested from
the other competing download services over a
six-month period — more than 200,000.53 †
During the last week of December 2003
alone, 1.9 million songs were downloaded
from iTunes – a rate of 100 million down-
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“The best way to combat piracy is to remove
the incentive by providing a better alterna-
tive. The vast majority of us pay for Internet
access. You can get it for free, but you have to
live with pop-up ads and limitations. Only a
tiny fraction of the public does that. We pay
for Internet access because we cannot abide
the annoyances. The renegade (file-sharing)
networks have an abundance of pop-up ads,
spyware, decoy files, viruses and sporadic
crashes.”
Phil Leigh of Raymond James and Associates,
quoted in USA Today, May 6, 2003.
“I used to say that the record business was like
a soft-drink company that sold its products in
nothing but 64-ounce bottles, because our
product was principally the full-length album.
Well, thanks to electronic distribution through
multiple types of networks with varied busi-
ness models, we now have the equivalent of
cans and six-packs and fountain drinks.
Consumers can buy digital music a la carte or
sign up for subscription services offering
unlimited downloads, and they can take their
tunes with them wherever they go.”
Hillary Rosen, Business 2.0.(a)
a. http://www.business2.com/articles/mag/
0,1640,48572,00.html.
† The system allows sharing across three authorized Macs, and
unlimited sharing among CDs and iPods that are pre-author-
ized. Id. Because Macintosh users represent only about 3 per-
cent of the PC market, usage numbers will be even larger now
that a Windows version has come out. Facing competition from
the iTunes service, Listen.com will lower the price to download
songs from its Rhapsody music service by 20 cents to 79 cents,
marking the latest move by paid music services to attract and
retain new ears. <http://www.wired.com /news/
digiwood/0,1412,59005,00.html>.
loads per year. Thirty million songs were
downloaded from iTunes between its May
introduction and the end of 2003.54 † The 
reasons for the Music Store’s popularity are
many. Rather than streaming music, it offers
all the songs available for download from the
big-five record labels for $.99 each — and is
very easy to use.55 Users can save downloaded
tracks on multiple devices, and can copy
music onto their own CDs — allowing time-
and space-shifting. Even iTunes has limita-
tions, because its inventory is not exhaustive
and users cannot take songs and convert
them directly into MP3 formats. But a version
of iTunes for Windows has been released, and
take-up of paid-for downloading is likely to
continue. Further experimentation will
undoubtedly explore different forms of fund-
ing support such as subscriptions, advertising,
and promotional funding, as well as different
means of competing with the free downloads
available through file sharing services by 
providing newly released music, concert tick-
et tie-ins, authenticated copies, and other
services.
At the same time, new competition to the
existing distribution channels is developing as
artists explore use of peer-to-peer file sharing
networks to sell music directly to their fans.
KazAa, where at any moment four million
users are sharing some 800 million files, will
offer rapper Ice T’s new album Repossession
for $4.99 over a secure platform. According
to the rapper, “With technology today, artists
don’t need to rely on the working of a tradi-
tional label to get their music to consumers,
and without the label being in the middle to
get a stake, it enables artists like myself to
generate more revenue through selling prod-
uct ourselves.”56
Thus, as the content industry is finding,
there are ways to compete with “free” — as
the ever-increasing number of people carry-
ing around bottles of purchased spring water
demonstrate.†† In the music business, “cheap
and great” is likely to be at least as attractive
to consumers as “free and crummy.” Many
analysts believe that the prospects for a rein-
vented music industry are quite positive.
There is nothing to indicate any lessening of
interest in listening to music; the very success
of Napster and its decentralized descendents
belie any such trend. Paradoxically, given the
perceived threat of computer copying and
distribution of music, listening to music on a
computer is one of the few things that can be
done while surfing the Internet — and more
and more people are spending more and
more time online. And as the explosion of
portable music devices has demonstrated over
the last four years, a market exists for music
on the move — delivered by satellite, carried
on a memory stick, or burned onto a “mix.”57
One powerful positive force supporting
these new models is the fact that online offer-
ings provide far greater choices of music for
customers everywhere than is available from
physical outlets. The rise of mass-market
retailers has tended to reduce access to a
broader range of music (while generally put-
ting downward pressure on prices). Even
music megastores, generally located in urban
areas, have a stock that is a small fraction of
the virtually unlimited choice of music avail-
able online regardless of the customer’s loca-
tion. It is estimated that approximately one
out of five customers leaves a music store
without purchasing anything because of inad-
equate selection or availability — a problem
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† See also, Apple, “iTunes Music Store Sells Ten Millionth
Song,” (press release, Cupertino, California, September 8,
2003) available at <http://www.apple.com/pr/library/
2003/sep/08musicstore.html.>
“The best technical protection model is a 
better business model.”
Joan Feigenbaum of Yale University at
Berkeley DRM conference.
†† In 2001, US sales of bottled water, which are expected to
pass sales of coffee and milk by 2004, were $6.5 billion. Bottled
water sales are growing at a rate of 10% per year, and are soon
likely to be second only to sales of soda in the US.
not faced by the online distributor whose
inventory costs are, at the same time, much
lower.58
In light of the fear of cannibalization of
existing markets, the experience of Amazon
in expanding the market for books is illustra-
tive. While approximately 60 percent of its
sales cannibalize sales of existing bookstores,
approximately 40 percent of its sales are addi-
tive.† Most of the music available in stores
today is in the form of new releases — what is
referred to as “front catalog” — and more
than half the sales are from this catalog. Yet
30-40 percent of sales are already from “back
catalog” — a figure likely to expand with
greater availability of items online, combined
with preference-based recommendations and
intelligent agents available to assist online
customers. (Webnoize found that Napster’s
greatest attraction was the vast choice of
music available to users.)††
New devices are likely also to increase the
market for music on the move. Cell phones
have already created a market for ring tones.
New mobile devices coming to market will
make it easier to download music over new
higher bandwidth mobile services.
Changes in relationships among the vari-
ous players in the value chain are likely as
technology improves and as greater band-
width in the “last mile” is available. Given the
threat of disintermediation of the distribution
system, it is likely that artists will seek a
greater share of the revenues; music publish-
ers who hold rights to songs themselves are
already seeking high returns for use of their
rights. Even given increases in monies owed
to music publishers and in marketing costs,
the reduction or elimination of manufactur-
ing and distribution costs (the largest catego-
ry of capital expenses for recorded music), as
well as reductions in the costs associated with
customer transactions, inventories, and
returns, increases the chances that successful
business models can be created based on
lower revenues — enabling offerings that can
more easily compete with free file-sharing
services.59
We believe there is a strong likelihood that
customers will find easily searchable, high
quality, downloadable, value-laden content
worth paying for online. Labels will continue
to be seen as indicators of value when con-
sumers are looking for works; labels will pro-
vide added value by “filtering” the vast
amounts of music available due to the low
cost of putting new music online and market-
ing particular customized selections to cus-
tomers. Consumers have already invested con-
siderable amounts to be able to enjoy the cre-
ative content of their choice and are likely to
go to a legitimate source of content if they
feel they are getting good value. Consumers
do not want to face the vagaries of slower,
more inaccurate, and less secure services.
Content distributors are well placed to pro-
vide services of greater value. The Digital
Connections Council encourages further
movement in this direction.
3. Existing solutions to the issue of unautho-
rized uses, such as enforcement and edu-
cation, should continue to be explored.
Current copyright law provides rights-
holders with very significant enforcement
tools. The Copyright Act allows for substantial
civil penalties and criminal remedies.≠ We see
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“The business model for the record labels has 
collapsed. Nobody wants to steal anything so 
long as there is a reasonable way to buy it at 
a fair price. The music industry has not caught
up fast enough with the demands of the market.”
Kunitake Ando, President Sony Corporation,
December 2002, quoted on cover of Digital
Media/Raymond James report.
† Artists who allowed free downloads increased sales by 40%.
Merrill Lynch Report, p.130.
†† The most popular response by respondents was breadth of
choice; the second most popular choice was instant gratifica-
tion; third was “free.” Raymond James Report, p.7. 
≠ Where a copyright is registered in a timely fashion, a court
has the discretion to award statutory damages of up to $30,000
for each copyrighted work infringed. If the infringement was
willful, the court can award statutory damages up to $150,000.
no reason why the content industry should
not use these tools; particularly as the great-
est threats to industry revenues (up to two-
thirds of all loses due to piracy) are from
commercially driven pirates duplicating 
physical media such as tapes and CDs. Such
large-scale offenders should be the subjects of
lawsuits — and we do not think that the con-
tent industry will alienate the mass market by
going after true pirates.†
Education about the rationale for copy-
right has taken on a new prominence in the
work of trade associations as file sharing by
consumers has exploded. It is an important
response and is likely to have a positive
effect.†† When taken together with well-publi-
cized enforcement actions, we think educa-
tion may be more effective than it has been
in the past— particularly if attractive, legal,
alternative sources for content exist beyond
Napster and its progeny. 
4. We recognize the need for digital rights
management (DRM) systems that will
allow creators to be rewarded for their
efforts. We are skeptical about govern-
ment-mandated DRM, and we recommend
that manufacturers not be required to
build in mandated copy protection tech-
nologies. But DRM systems provide a use-
ful “speed bump” for consumers by
inhibiting unauthorized uses of materials.
During this period of consensus building
about “safety valves” in intellectual prop-
erty law, we encourage continued experi-
mentation in private DRM systems. In par-
ticular, the capacity of such systems to
accommodate users’ rights traditionally
allowed under intellectual property law
needs to be further explored so that the
appropriate copyright balance can be
maintained. If government-mandated sys-
tems are proposed, they should be evaluat-
ed on the basis of their capability to main-
tain such a balance and their convenience
for consumers. Consumers should play a
substantial role in evaluating and approv-
ing mandated technological protection 
systems.
Some DRM developments are crucial for
any system that needs to monitor use of copy-
righted digital information in order to pro-
vide rewards for rights-holders; other forms
of DRM may be quite useful in enabling
rights-holders to allow multiple choices for
the use of content in response to differing
customer needs. But we also need to think
carefully about the ability of DRM systems to
prevent what has previously been viewed as
legitimate access to information, and to tech-
nically enforce rules that would prevent
reverse engineering or criticism of a product.
Most importantly, we must understand the
ability of DRM systems not only to protect
copyrighted materials from unauthorized use
but also their ability to technically accommo-
date those aspects of copyright that provide
“safety valves” that release the pressure of
rights-owner control. And consumers need 
to be part of these ongoing discussions and
evaluations.
We have attempted to focus on the ques-
tion of whether there is a way for technology
to accommodate what the law has previously
recognized as existing patterns of reasonable
consumer uses. It is even more difficult for
technology to accommodate the unknown —
the new, as-yet-undiscovered reasonable uses
enabled as new technologies emerge. This 
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† In recent months, the RIAA has initiated legal enforcement
actions against actively pursued hundreds of individuals
uploading very large numbers of files to peer-to-peer networks.
As Alan Davidson of the Center for Democracy and
Technology recently stated, “While enforcement action is
unpopular, it is necessary and preferable to the alternatives. ...
It is unhealthy for our country, and unfair to copyright hold-
ers, for large numbers of people to routinely violate the law of
the land.” Davidson, testimony before the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, hearing on
Consumer Privacy and Government Technology Mandates in
the Digital Media Marketplace, September 17, 2003. 
†† The RIAA has recently mounted an education campaign
aimed at school children that involves a game called “Starving
Artist,” in which students come up with an idea for a record
album, cover art, and lyrics. After this exercise is completed, a
teacher tells them that the album is already available for down-
load for free. According to the New York Times, the teacher
would then “ask them how they felt when they realized that
their work was stolen and that they would not get anything for
their efforts.” Laura Holson, “Studios Moving to Block Piracy
of Films Online,” The New York Times, September 25, 2003.
latter task may be impossible. But what we
have learned from our experience with the
Internet — an experimental laboratory for
the creativity of half a billion users — is that
the best rules are those that allow for the 
possibility of presently uncontemplated uses.
Given the risks to innovation posed by
DRM, our current belief is that the law
should apply the first sale and fair use doc-
trines to digital content regardless of the digi-
tal rights management scheme imposed by
the rights-holder. These rights should not be
ignored simply because technology makes it
possible to ignore them. At the same time,
the law should not permit anyone to make
and distribute unauthorized copies of digital
content to the public — simply because tech-
nology makes this possible. 
We think this approach is appropriate
(and necessary) for several reasons. First, fair
use is an inherently subjective, case-by-case,
fact-specific inquiry. No one knows in
advance that any particular use of content is
assuredly fair. For this reason, many believe it
is impossible to completely “code” fair use.
Allowing a 30-second snippet to be emailed
to a friend is likely to be appropriate fair use
of a two-hour movie (or might not, depend-
ing on circumstances), but probably would
not be fair use of a 30-second independent
film short. Second, if someone overcame the
difficult problems of coding in fair use as it is
now, they might inadvertently cause future
reasonable uses to be blocked. “Coding in”
fair use might itself stifle innovation. 
Because it is difficult — perhaps impossi-
ble — to “code” fair use, some have argued
that DRM systems should not have to accom-
modate the purposes underlying fair use and
first sale, and thus should be able to block
reasonable consumer uses (such as emailing a
program to a friend). But claiming that it is
“too difficult” is not a sufficient answer. Such
an answer removes the incentives to over-
come the problem from the party who, seek-
ing societal protection, has the greatest incen-
tive to solve it. Moreover, protection of intel-
lectual property is inherently a social con-
tract. It is a matter of collective consensus
(now embodied in copyright law) about the
reasonableness of particular choices to use
content in particular ways. It is not a matter
of neutral enforcement by the state of a pri-
vate party’s decisions to exclude others from
access. (Nor is it a matter of giving all parties
that get access to a particular thing the right
to deal with it as they see fit.) And, in order
for a stable and self-enforcing intellectual
property regime to exist, the social contract
must be one that reflects our collective views.
Having “no fair use” as the default setting
does not reflect the bargain that has histori-
cally been struck —- and there is no indica-
tion that a new bargain has gained societal
acceptance. 
The problem, of course, is that unless fair
use is specified in some binary way there is no
way to incorporate it into any digital rights
management system. No DRM scheme we
know about can simultaneously protect
against unauthorized uses and allow individ-
ual overrides whenever the user feels that
what he or she is doing is reasonable. An
alternative might provide for coding in gener-
al rules that would likely accommodate a
majority of situations that all parties would
agree would meet the fair use tests; but such
a system would not likely cover all fair uses,
and would certainly not accommodate new
reasonable uses that emerge with technologi-
cal progress. While such coding might pro-
vide a “floor” for fair use, it is equally possible
that it would become a “ceiling.” This dilem-
ma suggests the importance of providing a
role for the courts to ensure (in a case by
case fashion) that the law reflects evolving
practices.
The Digital Connections Council realizes
that rights-holders are anxious to have gov-
ernment mandated and private DRM regimes
in place and is sympathetic to their concerns
and the threats they face from unauthorized
digital copying and distribution. As a society,
we could respond by greatly increasing the
control offered to the rights-holder by man-
dating DRM systems that do not allow “wiggle
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room” for existing or new uses of content. Or
we could prevent the imposition of new costs
on the follow-on innovator and the narrowing
of the public domain that would result from
such a mandate by requiring that DRM sys-
tems be evaluated in light of their effect on
the existing balance between creators’ rights
and public rights.
One other point needs to be made about
this choice. At present the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act prohibits the circumvention of
effective technological protection mecha-
nisms. The effect of this prohibition is to pro-
tect material that may not be copyrightable
and, more importantly, to bar access to copy-
rightable material even for purposes that
would clearly be considered fair use. As we
consider the future role of digital rights man-
agement systems, we should consider how to
ensure that courts are empowered to protect
fair, private, noncommercial uses, even in the
presence of such systems.
5. Market-based economic tools that provide
incentives for copyright-holders to facili-
tate follow-on innovation should be con-
sidered—including measures to provide
earlier dedication of copyrighted materials
to the public domain.
We should not necessarily be constrained
by the current policy debate as we seek to
resolve the “digital dilemma.” It may be that
different incentives for copyright-holders will
provide the encouragement authors need to
continue to create, while protecting the
future of innovation and the public domain.
For example, indirect subsidies of some kind
— in exchange for a form of “compulsory
license” allowing unfettered use of content —
should be explored. It may be possible to 
create a collective rights association on the
ASCAP/BMI model that can allocate pay-
ments — perhaps even micropayments —
made by downloaders to appropriate recipi-
ents. The valuation and allocation questions
posed by such proposals are very difficult, but
that should not mean that discussion of these
models never takes place. The Digital
Connections Council encourages relevant
stakeholders to look at alternative models.
Such models may include historical ideas that
emerged out of periods of technological
change, as well as new models that can be
considered today only because of technical
developments.†
Similarly, it may be possible to broaden
the public domain. Should economic incen-
tives be created to encourage rights-holders
to dedicate their content to the public before
their statutory term of copyright protection
expires? It is beyond question that most of
the value of a copyrighted work resides in its
use in the early years of its copyright protec-
tion.†† Might it be in the public interest to
require some low-cost renewal process that
would encourage rights-holders to decide
whether to continue to assert their copyright
rights or to allow the work to enter the public
domain? Such a proposal would, at the least,
allow interested parties to know who holds
the rights in a particular work of authorship.
At the present time, the costs involved in
making this determination create obstacles to
works being used by follow-on innovators.
Such a renewal proposal would not fix the
digital dilemma, but might contribute to a
broadening of materials available to society as
a whole.
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† For example, the BBC recently announced that they would
embrace Napster-like file sharing to make their archives free
for those who paid a nominal license. The Guardian, August 28,
2003.
†† See Economists’ Brief.
We are sympathetic to the problems con-
fronting the content distribution industry. It
is beyond question that this industry faces
real problems that deeply affect its future.
But these problems — perfect copies of high-
value digital works being transmitted instantly
around the world at almost no cost — require
clear, concentrated thinking, rather than
quick legislative or regulatory action. As
Thomas Edison said: “There is time for every-
thing.” Given the present limitations on
bandwidth, the immaturity of many technical
protection systems, and the inevitable unfore-
seen consequences of governmental actions,
there is time to lay a stable foundation for
intellectual property rules in the digital
world.
Given CED’s mandate, the Digital
Connections Council has attempted to exam-
ine the current digital copyright issues within
the context of concern for the overall eco-
nomic health of this country. We believe this
economic perspective — and in particular an
understanding of the sequential nature of
innovation — has not been adequately taken
into account in the public debate. We also
believe it is not too late for thoughtful discus-
sion to find solutions that will prove broadly
acceptable and encourage self-enforcement
rather than an increase in litigation or regula-
tion. It will be essential for thoughtful and
inventive key stakeholders to sit down togeth-
er to work through these problems. The
Digital Connections Council looks forward to
joining in such discussions and hopes this
report will provide a helpful perspective.
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For 60 years, the Committee for Economic
Development has been a respected influence
on the formation of business and public policy.
CED is devoted to these two objectives:
To develop, through objective research and
informed discussion, findings and recommenda-tions
for private and public policy that will contribute to
preserving and strengthening our free society, achiev-
ing steady economic growth at high employment and
reasonably stable prices, increasing productivity and
living standards, providing greater and more equal
opportunity for every citizen, and improving the
quality of life for all. 
To bring about increasing understanding by pres-
ent and future leaders in business, government, and
education, and among concerned citizens, of the
importance of these objectives and the ways in which
they can be achieved. 
CED’s work is supported by private volun-
tary contributions from business and industry,
foundations, and individuals. It is independ-
ent, nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nonpolitical.
Through this business-academic partner-
ship, CED endeavors to develop policy state-
ments and other research materials that com-
mend themselves as guides to public and busi-
ness policy; that can be used as texts in college
economics and political science courses and in
management training courses; that will be con-
sidered and discussed by newspaper and maga-
zine editors, columnists, and commentators;
and that are distributed abroad to promote
better understanding of the American eco-
nomic system.
CED believes that by enabling business lead-
ers to demonstrate constructively their concern
for the general welfare, it is helping business to
earn and maintain the national and communi-
ty respect essential to the successful function-
ing of the free enterprise capitalist system.
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